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INTRODUCTION
Brand Leads

Imagine, that you are walking into someone’s home for the first time, perhaps a co-worker you
have known for a while, and as you do, try to re-create the kind of awareness and observational
perspective you would have as you do so. Your eye moves around the room, from the TV to the set of
high bookcases, back to the couch, then along to a desk, computer, set of speakers, smartphone, then back
to the TV. You continue and walk into the next room gazing at the contents: what’s on the book shelves,
what’s in the kitchen, pantry etc. What kind of house did you picture? I mean, what kind of a TV, what
kind of books on the bookcases, what kind of couch, what kind of computer, speakers, and smartphone?
What do these things tell you about their owner? And, how? Now, can you describe any of these things in
this person’s home without the brand? Did you picture the TV, the computer, the speakers, the
smartphone without your mind picturing and engaging a specific brand? Now imagine you’ve walked
through the whole house and looked at every room. You’ve seen every single thing a person owns, but
what did you really notice—the brand. What can these brands tell you about what kind of person lives
here?
The right answer, if you got it, is quite a lot. At least this is the answer that our modern consumer
societies’ economy is betting on. From 2015 to 2016, global advertising expenditure grew by 4.6% to
$579 billion, up from last year’s 3.9%— on trend with the ever-increasing amount of money that is being
poured into the brand (Barraclough). On the consumer’s end, marketing experts estimate that most
Americans are exposed to somewhere between 4,000 to 10,000 branded advertisements every day. Of
course, nobody would recall actually seeing, say, 6,000 ads in their day because we’ve all developed a
careful filtering process to ignore the vast majority of these messages. Rather than overburden our brains
by trying to recall how many ads you can remember seeing since you woke up, imagine an average
morning: you wake up, check your email, your FaceBook, Twitter, maybe you Google what the weather
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is going to be like today. At this point in time your brand count is maybe a couple hundred ads already.
Next you get out of bed and open your closet to get dressed—maybe another 20 or 30 brand registrations
and decisions here— I won’t ask you to open your pantry, watch TV, listen to the radio, browse the
net….you get the picture. All of these seemingly passive, quiet, and unconscious moments we share with
brand are happening constantly with almost every individual across the globe. But still, when it comes to
actually thinking through and trying to understand how brand impacts our everyday life, let alone
everyone else’s, or how this gets woven into in the fabric of our culture, we are silent. Yet the effect and
impact of this near-constant and deeply engaging brand contact is happening largely unconsciously. The
role, place, meaning and impact of brand on our world remains largely unexplored and illusory.
Our project begins with the seemingly straightforward question, “what is brand?” However, we
immediately find ourselves at an impasse before the project has even begun, recognizing that our most
basic conceptions of the consumer/brand relationship are largely incompatible with the theoretical
framework put forward by dominant discourse of brand. As a result, without a discourse to fully ground
ourselves in, our project must start from a kind of beginning. In short, we must not only reconstruct and
reformulate a notion of the consumer/brand binary and answer the basic question “what is brand,” but
also go beyond and develop a full ethnographically-based framework that allows us to move beyond the
binary and engage the more important questions of how brand works in relation to consumer identity.
This leads us to chart a framework designed to address and engage the precise ways individual identity
and brand interact. Focusing on one’s individual identity and brand, we arrive at a conception of brand
acting as a dynamic vehicle for self-creation, constructing and externalizing identity as well as conferring
agency to the consumer. Thus, our project is not just a question of what is brand, but an engagement of
how brand works, a question that ultimately reveals itself to be inherently intertwined with the larger
question of identity itself.
What is at stake in the engagement of brand is nothing less than the fundamental question of
individual identity in our modern consumerist society. To ignore or dismiss the influence of brand in our
modern culture, as well as its deeply imbedded presence in the very fabric of our society, is to be blind to
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the power and reach of the now-global corporate power structure. The necessity of engaging both
philosophy and anthropology in addressing the brand is plainly visible as brand continues to occupy an
increasingly powerful cultural role. The greatest project to dismantle and engage consumerism—with
the brand as its spiritual core– was, after all, undertaken by generations of anthropologically and
philosophically-minded thinkers from the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. But today, when
consumerism and the power of the marketplace has reached its apex, relatively speaking, there is an
undeniable silence on brand and consumerism. The project of engaging the nature of the brand practically
requires that we bear in mind the classic concerns and methodologies of both philosophy and
anthropology when addressing it today. From the vantage point of philosophy, brand is intertwined with
the fundamental questions of individual and collective identity. What does it mean to live in a world
where identity has seemingly been commodified? This is a question we can only uncover if we return to
the most foundational philosophical questions and texts. From the vantage point of anthropology, the
cultural force of the brand as a structuring force on every level, from the individual to the highest
echelons of ideology, is undeniable even as it takes on different forms in different cultural contexts.
Equipped with the methodology of ethnographic fieldwork, anthropology is uniquely situated to engage
the brand in a way that would take us beyond just the theoretical. Even in the more recent past, questions
of consumption and brand were infrequently overtly linked to identity-creation, but today it is rampant
and impossible to ignore. With the advent of an increasingly social media space and an increasingly fast
and nimble marketplace to match it, the speed with which we see, internalize, and consume brand races
forward. Today, I can see my favorite celebrity wearing a certain pair of Nikes and in just two business
days Amazon will have them on my doorstep. Any critical engagement with brand ultimately leads back
to an engagement with identity, which is itself a distinctly modern feature in the ever-changing landscape
of brand. The stakes in critically engaging brand only increases and grows more insistent each day as it
matches the ballooning cultural phenomena that is brand.
As an overview, our project is a kind of journey that unfolds and develops into an ever-deeper
understanding of brand, and we must move slowly and carefully. Employing and engaging both
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philosophy and anthropology, our project seeks to trace the development of the “modern” brand through a
philosophical discourse that begins with ancient Greek philosophical thought on property, identifying a
tension and instability inherent in this earliest writing on the product in a social context, before arriving at
Marx’s commodity, where the language of property gives way to the language of commodity which
encodes an inherent social instability. With Marx’s alienated commodity we see that the instability or
tension inherent in the commodity is a product of the void created by the rupture of social meaning and
economic meaning. As we see, the brand—as a device of meaning-making—inevitably gravitates towards
this Marxian void between consumer and the commodity, presenting the possibility of reinventing the
alienated and abstracted commodity. In short, our philosophical journey traces the tensions and instability
of the product turned commodity, and having identified the salient characteristic of the commodity to be
its unstable social meaning, we see how the brand is invoked to step in to fill this gap. Our initial
philosophical analysis allows us not only to definitionally situate and engage the modern brand, but also
to identify its naturalized salient characteristics as an unstable site where meaning is constantly created
and recreated by the engagement and relationship between brand and the consumer.
With a working definition for brand, as well as a developing picture of the core social tensions it
is rooted in, our engagement with anthropology began by modernizing the discourse of the brand, finding
that the binary of brand as a consumer/brand relationship was the dominant discursive theoretical
framework for understanding and engaging brand—the same theory we came to in the previous section.
Reviewing and engaging the anthropological writing related to the brand, our project found that very little
work had been done to engage any grounded or situated analysis of this purely theoretical brand as
consumer/brand binary. Engaging the literature related to brand allowed our project to see more clearly
the points where brand was being engaged, but more importantly where it was not. Introducing and
situating the ethnographic context of our project and its brand knowledge, we critically engage the focus
group as a unique site of knowledge production. Having situated our project in a larger anthropological
discourse on brand, as well as providing the ethnographic dimensions, our project put forward its own
situated ethnographic account of what brand is, attempting to go beyond the binary of consumer/brand to
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engage how brand actually works.
Our anthropological analysis begins with brand as a relationship between consumer and brand;
our provocation emerges out of an insistence on a situated analysis of the intersection of brand and
identity, arguing that brand serves as a dynamic vehicle for self-creation, constructing and externalizing
identity and conferring agency to the consumer. As our project presents, when you see yourself as
recognized by a brand, you are effectively translating a meaning and making it your own in a process—no
matter how large or small—of self-creation. Furthermore, we present that, in the relational engagement
with brand, consumers have recognized that they are spoken to and heard, and on a fundamental level that
brand confers upon its consumer some degree of agency solely by virtue of the consumer choosing the
brand they feel better fits their identity—and in doing so, through this consumption they take possession
of brand and its properties. Recognizing a deficit in our knowledge of how the particular binary of
consumer/brand actually functions on a grounded level, our project presents not only a new framework
for engaging with and understanding brand but also an insistent focus on the productive points of
intersection between brand and identity. Through a focus on the individual consumer’s engagement with
brand, we see a dimensionalized portrait of what brand is and exactly how it works. This allows us to
critically engage with the modern brand, as well as recognize and anticipate the movement of brand as it
becomes an increasingly important part of individual identity, ultimately ending at the critical juncture of
“self branding,” where identity itself takes on brand-like qualities. Our construction of a new framework
for thinking about brand allows us to not only critically engage with brand as we see it, but also points us
towards a critical engagement with the modern reality of the individual living in an increasingly branded
world. Ending our project by returning to the most basic questions of individual identity, through our
engagement with Hegel we ultimately see, even more clearly than before, that the project of
understanding brand is inextricably linked with the project of understanding the self on an individual
level. Our project concludes by attempting to situate the brand in an increasingly tumultuous world where
knowledge, identity, and the role of the brand are rapidly transforming, and where personal identity and
agency is being turbo-charged in the process.

6
Our project is ambitious, in part by choice and in part by necessity, yet nonetheless we must
deliver a project that is only possible through a unique perspective: the perspective of an outsider writing
on brand through the lens of philosophy and anthropology, but also as an insider who has worked in the
intimate site of brand knowledge production that is the focus – through my work as qualitative research
consultant. This is, in part, why I purposefully move between “I” and “we” in the different contexts of our
project; in some instances I am speaking from my personal experience and analysis and in other instances
my analysis is grounded in the context of my work and requires a plural pronoun. At the same time, this
“we” must also be distinguished from the autorial “we” employed more generally when discussing “our”
project. Thus, in many ways our project can deliver a framework for understanding and engaging brand
that is a unique result of this reflexive insider perspective on strategic brand positioning as an independent
consultant—a niche job, in an already niche field. On a basic level, this project endeavors to go beyond
delivering a new framework for understanding and engaging brand, by substantiating it with context,
quotes, and perspectives directly from focus groups. Of course, this ethnographic material is filtered
through the lens of a marketer to some degree; however, in many ways it also remains open and
unadulterated for broader considerations. For example, when I observe a focus group I do not simply
capture content pertinent to the particular client’s project and its goals, but I write and capture everything.
In this way, even when I have forgotten what specific “learnings” the project produced, I still have
complete notes that offer insight for broader considerations. Frequently, someone will say something
incredibly interesting in a focus group that has little or nothing to do with the “learning” we are producing
for the client, but nevertheless this comment is always bolded. In this way, while I cannot fully escape the
marketer within, the raw data offers the possibility of repurposing one’s focus, and when I return to my
notebook I am looking at it in a distinctly different way and seeing distinctly different themes and ideas
emerge.
Equally important as the uniqueness my project gains through the inclusion of ethnographic
content, is my perspective on brand and my understanding of how and why it works, as the result of
several years of work engaging brand in many different ways and in many different contexts. The result is
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a strong, yet reflexive, eye towards how brand is written about, expressed, inhabited and engaged with. At
the same time, this does not rob me of any open-mindedness to new ways of understanding brand, as the
work we do requires that one’s perspective be as fluid and dynamic as the brand. While I come with this
kind of ‘bias’ that I freely admit to, I see it as a strength rather than a weakness. My hope is that this will
add some clarity to my project, while preempting certain preconceptions. While it is inevitable that some
will see my position inside the world of marketing as an inherent blind point that might compromise my
project, for the most part I hope that readers can understand that it is possible, or even advantageous, for a
embedded brand marketer to write critically about brand. I have no connections to any of the clients or
products I have worked on; the only connection I have to certain brands are the ones I’ve created
myself—just like any other consumer. While my project takes on something of a polemic tone when
discussing the literature relating to brand—which I, in part, can’t help, due to the strong beliefs I’ve
accrued about brand—my project ultimately is not an argumentative one, as I purposefully avoid making
value judgements about whether the cultural power of brand is a good thing or a dangerous thing, also
avoiding value judgments about the “authenticity” of any individual’s engagement with brand. This is not
a difficult position for me to take because it is the most honest one. I don’t have or pretend to have the
answers to these questions, even for myself. Thus, I hope my project will reflect this honesty. I hope my
authoritative voice will come through when it is appropriate, and that my purposeful silence will also be
heard. If my project has one overarching goal, it is to show that the cultural and individual phenomenon
of brand is something that reveals itself as necessitating our collective critical engagement and attention.

8
SECTION I- Philosophy of Brand: Tracing an Instability

Chapter 1- Introducing Our Philosophical Approach
Although the distinct language of “brand” is undoubtedly a modern invention, when distilled to
its functional definition we see it to be as old as recorded human thought. Material, in the broadest sense
of the word, has never existed outside of a dialectic cultural context. It is named, given meaning, identity
and place. This is especially apparent in commodified material, in property. The commodity, a thing
worth selling, buying, and owning, is a material whose cultural meaning or identity is necessarily
elevated. We see that, even at this basic level, we have not strayed too far from the instinctual modern
ideation of what a brand is. The commodity must have a dialectic cultural identity, a value, a meaning; it
must have a place in the relational world of humans and material. Gold is a classic and prevailing
example of this — the value of gold is not a product of its material physicality, but rather its cultural
meaning. Still, this same basic principle is at play in almost any kind of property. Even when commodity
or property is spoken of as just a physical thing, its implicit meaning is actually its defining characteristic.
Although the physicality of the product may subsume its meaning, the cultural dialectic nature of product
remains its essential character.
Philosophy is, etymologically, a joining of Greek philo meaning “love of,” and sophia, broadly
defined as a search for wisdom, knowledge, and the nature of existence. While it may seem curious to
begin a project concerned with the modern nature of property and brand in relation to human identity, by
first firmly grounding ourselves in the practice of philosophy, we quickly come to see why. If we
ultimately aspire to understand the modern commodified property and its brand, we must naturally begin
with a discussion of property in its earliest formulations. As we will later come to see, the brand only
exists with property— it can only exist through the union of the two. Although the language of the brand
is modern, definitionally it can be reduced to a cultural meaning or identity that is projected into or onto a
product. Thus, while early philosophers are not themselves using the word “brand,” they are speaking
about the cultural meanings and identities affixed to the world of property and product. As our project

9
unfolds and progresses towards the modern human relationship with the branded commodity, and as our
answers slowly emerge, we must see that, although the discourse surrounding property changes and
evolves, many fundamentals remain intact.
We take philosophy as our starting place for two distinct reasons: Firstly, as humans, we exist
both practically and metaphysically in a world of things, most of which are made of property; thus, both
our practical knowledge of the world, and our more metaphysical wisdom and knowledge of the same
world, begin at a distinctly physical and spiritual philosophical place. Secondly, as will be discussed in
short order, the tradition of philosophy itself demands that we take property as an essential philosophical
beginning. In short, even if our first reason were to falter, as if perhaps philosophy is not as essential to
understanding the nature of the human relationship to property, the second firmly refutes this, demanding
that we acknowledge property as a starting place. Thus, if we were to embark on a project that seeks to
address the modern meaning and nature of property in its commodified and branded forms, whether we
choose to or not, we are demanded by philosophy to begin any investigation into the product and its
meanings within her domain.
We begin with Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics, not only because they represent some of
the earliest recorded Western thought, nor simply because they undeniably serve as the headwaters of
Western Philosophy (and far beyond), but because both texts center themselves around a discussion of
property. This speaks to our second “reason,” that ancient Greek thought demands that we begin our
thinking with a consideration of the nature of property in human life. From here, we jump forward to
Kant’s Anthropology, a text that moves us beyond the more difficult and abstract discussion of property
and individual, to an individual who are themselves an object separable from the world they observe.
Kant modernizes us and provides our project with an essential perspective, while also strategically
serving as a bridge between early philosophical thought and a more familiar “social science” dialectic of
individuality. Moving closer towards more culturally and anthropologically-bent ways of thinking, we
come to rest with Marx, a thinker and philosopher who fundamentally reimagines a framework for
considering society and property. Each philosopher represents a kind of turn in the way we think about
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society and property, and it is only through tracing and engaging with these thinkers that we can ground
any kind of understanding of the unstable liminal space that the modern brand occupies in society. Each
text represents, and uniquely contributes to, our understanding of what brand is and does, and why it has
appeared in many iterations and forms to serve as the companion of property. As an historical
philosophical journey, these texts are as illustrative in their performance of the instability of property, as
they are important in understanding how notions of property and brand have developed. To understand
the modern nature of the brand, we must come to understand how the instability and tension that seems
inherent in the relationship between culture and consumption, individual and commodity, has created the
necessity of the brand in its modern form.
Chapter 2- The Problem of Property in Ancient Greek Thought
Within Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics, two of the most canonical texts in philosophy,
the problem of ownership or possession is a theme that each text circles around. However exhaustively
the problem of property is addressed or answered by the formulation of the state, the fundamentally
problematic nature of property is taken for granted. Although the structure of Plato’s Republic seems to
be predicated on and around notions of property and ownership, there is no apparent substantive
interrogation of the nature of property. Insofar as we know that property is problematic, especially with
regard to class relations, we never know exactly why; thus, the problem of property remains a
destabilizing force. Much remains the same in Aristotle’s Politics, although the themes of ownership and
property take on different dimensions that are more directly suggestive of the essential yet unanswered
question of property. Although each text reveals the inherent instabilities and tensions of property in their
own distinct formulations and contexts, the ultimate effect is that they both present the fundamental
essentiality of discussing property and its problematic nature, yet also remain silent on what exactly
makes the basic act of owning property so problematic. Although both texts will be analyzed forthwith in
regards to this, the curiosity of this apparent “silence” on the problem of property is intensified by the
historical fact that there was a vibrant discourse surrounding material wealth, greed, and commodification
in the context of the state. This aspect of commodification, in a distinctly numeric economic sense, is
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suggested by the vocabulary of the Greek language itself. There is ploútos, which perhaps most closely
corresponds to wealth, which roughly translates as a derivative of polýs, which means “much in number.”
Pleonexia, a philosophical concept which occurs in Aristotle’s Politics, Plato’s Republic, and much later
in Hobbes’s Leviathan, corresponds roughly to greed or covetousness. More specifically, this is often
interpreted as roughly translating to “the desire for more than one’s share;” again we see a specific
attention paid to the nature of balance or justice in relation to the distribution of material or commodity
(Balot, 28). The many linguistic formulations of different strains of greed in the ancient Greek
vocabulary, coupled with the prevalence of wealth and greed as a common trope or motif in writing,
poetry, and theater, and its massive political and cultural significance in the philosophical thought of this
time, should cause us to even further question the “silence” of these two seminal texts. But also, perhaps
we should consider whether, in this instance, “silence” is not just an historic oddity, but rather is
indicative of an inherent uncertainty and instability surrounding the nature of humans and material.
Beginning with the destructive nature of material desire, Plato claims it as the natural state of
man, and, while Aristotle will soften this claim substantially, arguing that greed is not an inherent human
trait, it seems to be taken as a priori that property is inherently tangled in the web of conflict, destruction,
greed, and desire. Ancient Greece’s preoccupation with material desire is seen not only in the writings of
Plato and Aristotle, but also in the complex vocabulary that differentiates different kinds of greed and
desire; aplestia is different from philochrematia, although they both concern an unquenchable desire for
more. Pleonexia, of which we have already spoken, occupies a central role in Plato’s Republic. The very
function of the state and of “justice” is predicated on the state more broadly as a direct counter to this
moral and social dysfunction. In the “formation of the city” in Book V, Plato writes on the common
“lazy” people, “They assume that what they see is available and proceed to arrange the rest, taking
pleasure in thinking through everything they’ll do when they have what they want, thereby making their
souls even lazier” (458b). Here, the common person is so enamored not simply by the product of their
desire, but rather by desire itself, that they are completely lost in lackadaisical inaction. Plato safeguards
his city from the conflict inherent in property by arguing that collective ownership is necessary to
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promote a common good. Socrates argues first positively, “…doesn’t this sharing of pleasures and pains
bind the city together?” and then negatively, “…doesn’t this privatization of pleasures and pains dissolve
the city?” (ibid. 462b). Invoking the thematic metaphor of the living city, Socrates asks, “Then, is the
best-governed city the one in which most say “mine” and “not mine” about the same things in the same
way?” (ibid. 462c). Yet, while Socrates clearly states that the best-governed city speaks with one voice on
property, the guardians are left with nothing nothing, “…if they’re going to be guardians, they mustn’t
have private houses, property, or possessions, but must receive their upkeep from the other citizens as a
wage for their guardianship and enjoy it in common” (ibid. 462c). Here we distinctly see that the
guardians, although hierarchically above the citizens, are singled out to maintain the balance of power
through their property-less-ness (ibid. 463b). Yet, in a seeming inversion, the guardians, who we clearly
see to be elevated above the citizens in every way, are reliant on the citizens for their basic needs of food
and water and expected to “enjoy it in common” with the citizens. We must also ask what the guardian
class, whose “upkeep” is already accounted for, is expected to do with their “wage” if they are forbidden
from owning any kind of property?
Here, we see Socrates quietly wielding property and material as a mechanism to level out or
counter-balance the inherently unequal relationship between the citizen and the guardian. Even in a world
where Socrates has seemingly designed a system that strips material property of all its power, he is quietly
using the necessary provisions of wage and upkeep—paradoxically reinforcing the necessity and power of
owned property which he has seemingly attempted to dethrone. True, wage and upkeep do not clearly
present themselves as property, but we see them as material infused with potent social power. Going on,
in the next paragraph, Socrates reflects, “Then isn’t it true, just as I claimed, that what we are saying now,
taken together with what we said before, makes better guardians out of them and prevents them from
tearing the city apart by not calling the same thing “mine?” Socrates’s guardians are more powerful, but,
paradoxically, material remains a power-broker between the citizen and the guardian (ibid. 464b). Were
the guardian to simply be a citizen with a small privilege over their fellows, these further explanatory
paragraphs would be rendered unnecessary. Their hierarchical presence alone, as well as the assumption
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of the guardians as conforming to the established rules of the city, betrays the instability. Although
Socrates succeeds in removing property, and thus creating a city of shared pleasures and shared pains, he
cannot avoid using owned material as a social tool. Thus, he has not truly stripped the nature of property
from itself in the context of exchange; what is important is that the guardians must receive their wage and
upkeep from the other citizens. Thus, on two levels we see that material property remains a power-broker.
Firstly, material is used to broker power between the citizen and the guardian, perhaps as a
counterbalance to the inherent inequality (especially if we remember the wolves and sheep metaphor
previously employed in (Plato 416d). Secondly, this power-brokering is reliant on reinforcing ownership
insofar as citizens must provide wage and upkeep for the guardians even if it is enjoyed, as Socrates
states, “in common.”
It should be noted that this is far from the only instability that surrounds the treatment and
development of material property in the Republic. In Book III, in what is the first articulation of the
formulation of the state with all its classes, the notion of property is again unstable. Considering the
guardians, Socrates asserts, “….they must also have the kind of housing and other property that will
neither prevent them from being the best guardians nor encourage them to do evil to other citizens.” The
picture painted here of the relation between the citizens and the guardians is notably different than what it
becomes in Book IV; here, the guardians have both housing and property, and although there is the
intention of encouraging peace between the two classes, it takes a different form (ibid. 416d). In this
iteration, the guardians have property, although, as Socrates states, it is not more than is “wholly
necessary;” furthermore, and most importantly, Socrates introduces a sort of manipulative lie, that the
guardians will be told that they already have gold and silver in their souls and thus they, “have no further
need for human gold. Indeed, we’ll tell them that it’s impious for them to defile this divine possession by
any admixture of such gold because many impious deeds have been done that involve the currency used
by ordinary people, while their own is pure” (ibid. 416d). The irony of the symbolic deployment of the
imagery of the most commodified of all commodities—gold—as a mechanism of social control meant to
keep the guardian class content with their property-less lives, cannot be ignored.
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While each chapter illustrates its own internal instability, this unmissable instability in Plato’s
treatment of property across the Republic is magnified and illustrated most clearly by comparing Book III
and IV. In Book III we see that the guardians are to have no property, even as property is wielded as a
mechanism of social control; but in book IV the guardians “must have property,” and again property (is?)
used as a mechanism of social control in the form of a manipulative lie. Illustrating its instability within
Plato’s “city,” we see that both the ideas of the ownership of property by the guardians changes radically,
just as the forms of social control over their ownership change. At no point between these two different
conceptions of property is there any explanation or justification, implicit or explicit, within the text, nor is
the overt problem of property ownership explicitly addressed.
Following Plato, yet grounding ourselves again in a return to wealth and ownership in the context
of ancient Greek philosophy, we turn to Aristotle. Well known for his notion of the “golden mean,”
Aristotle seems to follow Plato in asserting that wealth and ownership is a finite and bounded thing, while
the desires of men know no such limit; what is needed for a “good life” is a moderate amount of wealth or
property. There is an often quoted line in Aristotle’s Politics where he is writing on the nature of the
household: “They are the elements of true wealth; for the amount of property which is needed for the
good life is not unlimited…but there is a boundary fixed…”. Aristotle, in his discussion of the household
and the state, attests that, “There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly called the
art of making money, and has in fact suggested the notion that wealth and property have no limit”
(Aristotle, 41-42). This keen focus on the economics of supply and demand characterize the treatment of
material of both Aristotle and Plato in the context of “the city,” with Aristotle going as far as to
differentiate the two modes of engagement with commodity: one that is necessary and natural, and one
that is excessive and destructive. Herein, Aristotle condemns the pursuit of money for the sake of money,
where, “Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of making money; this they
conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end all things contribute” (ibid. 49). Thus, while we
have a picture of the greedy man as going against “the good” by disrupting the natural order of the world,
despite this pragmatic and vaguely moralistic condemnation, at this point there is no deeper discussion as
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to the proper relationship between individual and property beyond the “golden mean.”
However, while there appears, superficially, to be a similar treatment of wealth and property
between the two concerning the formative nature of property, Aristotle goes beyond Plato in key ways.
While both see greed as a vice, Aristotle does not go as far as Plato in suggesting that greed is an inherent
character of individual. Responding directly to Plato’s Republic in Book II, Aristotle defends the
necessity of private property, arguing that private property promotes solidarity and prudence, as he writes,
“Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private, for, when every one has a
distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because
everyone will be attending to their own business” (ibid. 126b). However, the most significant break
between both Plato and Aristotle, and perhaps in our project’s preoccupation with the early Greek concept
of material, is Aristotle’s corollary argument on the inherently expressive nature of personal property, as
when he writes that, “Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure when a man feels a thing to be his
own; for the love of the self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in gain although selfishness is
rightly censured…” Here, Aristotle is attesting to the potential of ownership not just as a pleasure, but as
the manifestation of a love of self implanted by nature (ibid. 1263b). However, Aristotle continues this
sentence with an immediate qualifier, suggestive of a kind of hesitation or uncertainty, “…this however,
is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser’s love of money; for all, or almost
all, men love money, and other such objects in a measure.” Admitting the duality of possession, Aristotle
contends that there is a natural joy experienced by the ownership of personal property, putting forward
this loss of “liberality in the matter of property” as the major argument against Plato’s property-less
vision.
However, far more important than any kind of disagreement between the two is the nascent
development of a uniquely reflexive and individualized treatment of property. Not only does Aristotle
point towards the benefits of sharing one’s slaves, but he goes far beyond this, writing “It is clearly better
that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislature is to
create men in this benevolent position.” It is admittedly curious that, while Aristotle seems to think that it
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would be better if property were private, admitting to the inherent pleasure of individual ownership, he
also presents private property’s ability to provide an “immeasurable pleasure” which mysteriously seems
to be located in the polis, “for the love of man is a feeling implanted by nature…” (ibid.1263b). It seems
that Aristotle’s notion of private ownership must be predicated on an idealized polis, a notion that remains
wholly theoretical. We draw attention to Aristotle’s claim of property as, “…immeasurably greater is the
pleasure when a man feels a thing to be his own,” not necessarily for its superficial break with Plato on a
conceptual level regarding the nature of property, but rather because it offers a wholly different treatment
of the value and necessity of pleasure. Its uniqueness is perhaps heightened by the similarities that Plato
and Aristotle share in their treatment of the nature of wealth and the distribution of property. Here, in a
surprising turn, Aristotle pulls the discussion of property from its discussion as a problematic, yet
relatively dull, political object, and gives voice to the value of material property as a thing itself. He does
not attempt to de-problematize material property, nor put it into a discourse with the broader theme of
wealth; in fact, as we see, property retains its danger. Aristotle’s unexpected turn towards the sensuous
nature of material property as something capable of providing what appears to be some kind of
individually experienced pleasure of selfhood, something located in the innate and “natural,” exemplifies
an uncertainty or an unspoken tension that seems to swirl beneath the surface in ancient Greek
philosophy. Aristotle hesitantly seems to draw closer to addressing the actual nature of the individual
relationship with property, adding yet another layer of complexity to the instability and tension.
Aristotle advances a notion of material property in relationship to the corporeal individual insofar
as he, within his section “Slavery-Justified,” equates property to freedom as contributing to an
individual’s status as both “free” and thus fit for citizenship and political life. Aristotle establishes a kind
of dualism inherent in the very act of possession, describing it as “… an instrument of action, separable
from the possessor,” a distinction that is arrived at through the explication of slavery as the directional
possession of slaves by his master, “The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him,
whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master but wholly belongs to him;” it is this “duality” of
possession that further elevates the importance of the ownership of personal property (ibid. 1253b). Just
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as it was for Plato, this formulation of master and slave which Aristotle calls a “science” is the social
construction that allows for politics and philosophy; as Aristotle writes in the “Rule of the Household,”
“Hence those who are in a position which places them above toil, have stewards to attend to their
households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics” (ibid. 1253b). Thus, Aristotle
is perhaps clearer than Plato in stating that the “science” of the possession of slaves is itself directly the
condition that allows for a participation in the political as a citizen (ibid. 1255b). Here, this possession of
slaves creates the order and stability of the household, which is the condition for political participation.
In short, this condition of political freedom is predicated upon, and even reified by, the possession of
human property. Interestingly, Aristotle’s discussion of the slave as a possession and of a definitional
notion of possession (which is arrived at and illustrated within the context of slavery) precedes his more
formal and basic description of property in the context of the “management of the household”—of which
we have already spoken. Again, this is illustrative of a deeper, yet unspoken, preoccupation with the
basic nature of material possession as a relationship between self and other that cannot be ignored.
Aristotle does indeed discuss property directly and formally, beginning, “let us now enquire into property
generally,” which seems the intuitive and obvious entry-point into a discussion of property; yet long
before this, Aristotle begins with a far more esoteric treatment of property and possession from the
position of the individual,
The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not
only the slave of his master but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and
office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s yet a man, is by nature a slave;
and he may be said to belong to another who, being a human being, is a possession. And a
possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor (ibid. 1253b).
In this paragraph, we see Aristotle addressing the fundamental nature of what it is to be a free man by
juxtaposing him against the slave, which by definition is corporeal. Here, the slave has no essence of his
own for he is without his own telos in that he does not belong to himself, and thus does not fulfill his own
ends but the ends of those he belongs to. This alienation of the self is so complete that he “wholly belongs
to him;” his ends are not his own but the ends of another, his identity is not his own but that of his master.
This seems to be an inversion of Aristotle’s enduring refrain that the proper activity of being is, “an
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activity of the soul in accordance with virtue;” to be a possession, a slave is to be an “instrument” serving
an “action” that is not his own—the complete alienation of self.
Thus, returning to the seeming curiosity of Aristotle leading his reader first through a difficult and
esoteric treatment of property and possession as it is seen in the context of slavery, before moving to a
more conventional discussion of property, an almost banal conversation of food and other crafts, we can
read Aristotle as providing us with two accounts of property. Both are framed in the context of slavery.
Firstly, we have Aristotle addressing the essential nature of slavery, that slavery is a complete possession,
a possession that renders the possessed a simple “instrument.” Secondly, we have a discussion of the role
of the slave—a discussion not unlike Plato’s. Yet the organization of Aristotle’s treatment of man as
possession reveals an implicit primacy of one discussion over the other. We see Aristotle present that the
division between the naturally-ruled soul and the naturally-ruling body is mirrored in society in the
division of men and slaves, “Where there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between
men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and can do nothing better),
the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under
the rule of a master” (ibid. 1254b). Here, the lower men cannot “possess” competent reason, and thus they
are fit only as an instrument to be possessed.
For both Plato and Aristotle, material property is embroiled in a struggle for domination in the
most literal sense. Within the political projects that both Plato and Aristotle are engaging in, the struggle
inherent in property and material ownership present themselves as formidable barriers. Both problematize
property, albeit in distinctly different ways. Aristotle seems to idealistically extol the virtue of private
property, while also seemingly admitting the inherent problem of ownership in a society. Aristotle’s
treatment of ownership and property curiously begins, or is prefaced, with a lengthy discussion of slavery,
again pointing towards his more individual-centric consideration of property. While it has tensions of its
own, perhaps Aristotle’s treatment of property overcomes some “silence” because it more directly
addresses the individual. Plato’s efforts to rid his Republic of the inherent vice of material possession are
riddled with tensions and instabilities, in part because of the sheer scale of his project. Even in his most
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thorough formulation of the Republic’s ideal “city,” we see that owned property remains as an essential
broker of power. Although it lingers beneath the surface, Socrates never directly discusses the nature of
property as it pertains to the individual, perhaps because of its instability, although we need not ask where
Plato stands on the matter of property. The contradictions, tensions, and instabilities inherent in property
disturb the still surface of Plato’s Republic from the very moment Socrates first describes his vision to
Glaucon, and it remains a destabilizing force throughout. The point here is not that Plato’s vision fails
because he begins with some incorrect formulation of property, nor that the Republic is ultimately flawed
because it fails to reconcile a coherent treatment of property. Rather, the point is found within the
“silence” of material property and how its problematic, destabilizing presence is ignored. Again and
again, the struggle over material property and possession shows itself quite visibly to be a central defect
of society that Socrates seeks to remedy in the construction of the Republic; yet, its essential nature is
never addressed.
Aristotle follows Plato in many key ways: they both agree upon the fundamentally problematic
nature of a political individual’s relationship to the material world of possessions and, most importantly
on a fundamental level, within the construction of a political vision, they are deeply occupied with the
question of the problem of material possession. However, Aristotle breaks with Plato in an essential way:
he approaches, however tentatively, the nature of the individual’s relationship to material. In both
instances, both in its introduction and eventual greater explication in the following pages and chapters,
Aristotle discusses slavery as part of a broader discussion of property; as he freely admits, slavery is just a
form of property. However, as we have previously highlighted, there is something curious in introducing
a part before its whole — that is, discussing the nature of property in terms of slavery, before discussing
property as its larger category, as Aristotle admits, “Now we should begin by examining everything in its
least elements…” (Aristotle 1253b). This purposeful organization, although seemingly curious, provides a
discussion of slavery as property before it discusses property as a part of the household, and provides us
with Aristotle’s conception of the nature of man and the nature of man’s possessing, before we arrive at
any discussion of property in a traditional sense. This attention to property in the formulation of the part

20
in relation to the whole is especially poignant following our discussion of the Republic.
Within some of the first pages of Aristotle’s Politics we come to an essential paragraph
discussing the precise relationship between master and slave. Here the discussion of possession, that
serves as the headwaters from which continuing discussions and formulations of property will follow, is
defined in the human context of the struggle for possession. Aristotle is clear, the master is master by
virtue of his mastery of the slave; here, the master does not belong to the slave, where the slave not only
belongs to the master, but “wholly” so. Aristotle’s formulation is careful and clear — it establishes the
master as owning, going beyond to emphasize the master’s independence from the slave, before it
establishes the doubly-emphasized bondage of the slave; the slave is not just a slave, but “wholly belongs
to him” (Ibid. 1253b). Here, the master’s “freeness” is counterposed against the utter corporeality and
contingent nature of the slave. We are not necessarily presented with a picture of what freedom for
Aristotle might be, so much as we are given, in detail, the utter alienation of the possessed. It is here—
framed between the master and the slave— that Aristotle presents us with the constellation of possession.
Aristotle closes by writing that, “And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable
from the possessor,” thus the salient characteristic of a “possession,” in this case a slave, is that it is an
“instrument,” a means to an end; this is a complete alienation for the slave, the severing of life and self
(1253b). Here, Aristotle’s emphasis centers around the nature of complete dependence.
If anything, we have something of a working framework for engaging with Aristotle’s notion of
property. In explicit terms we see property not simply as the ambient destructive force as it appears in
Plato’s Republic or even as it is described in Aristotle’s other writings on property, but as a force that
constitutes its own destructive nature; where before property is destructive in a general social sense, here
it is incarnate in the literal subjugation of one man over another. However, at the same time, we must
question the broader impetus for Aristotle introducing property and, in turn, freedom and bondage, in
such a curious and charged context. To what degree we could take the formulation of human possession
beyond this context in order to engage more general questions of the individual and ownership is another
difficult, lingering question. This is not the only place where Aristotle grants us a more humanized
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treatment of property in individualized dimensions.
All of this said, Aristotle may go beyond Plato in some small ways in that he addresses the nature
of property more directly in its essential nature and in its embodiment in the individual; these are but brief
moments in a text that generally treats property as an inert thing. Yet, just as the Republic struggles to
address property as anything other than a vague and confused social force, while at the same time
suggesting, and at times indicating, a deep struggle beneath the surface of the text, Aristotle does not go
significantly further. While the ghost of unattended property seems to make itself quite known through
small tensions and struggles within the Republic, the ghost of unattended property within Aristotle’s work
presents more directly, but on fewer occasions and in a much more abstract context. Again, within both
texts, property and its assumed relationship with man is left undeveloped, despite the fact that it is the
major focal point around which both texts appear to spin. So we must ask why: Why is property so close,
yet so far? So essential, yet so neglected?
Now, our project is not a project on the nature of personal property, nor is it a project that desires
to chart the philosophies relating to property. Our treatment of Plato and Aristotle is admittedly hasty and
necessarily incomplete. However, the origins of something (however they appear from our rear view
mirror) are always essential. Through tracing the origin of the human relationship to property, we see a
number of important things that can propel us forward. Firstly, and most obviously, as we have seen, the
canon of Western Philosophy has its origins deeply set in a philosophy of material, a philosophy that
presents property as an essential social problem as evidenced by the fact that two of the greatest works of
philosophy appear to have the problem of property as one of their central foci. Secondly, there is an
undeniable instability inherent in this treatment and ideation of property, a resistance to metaphorically
pulling property aside—isolating it— and seeking to make sense of it. Thirdly, the problem of private
property is a social and political problem that is only visibly addressed through the efforts to create or
critique sociopolitical systems. Just as the metaphorical problem of property is not deconstructed, the
individualistic treatment of property — how one ought to relate to the world of material things and
possessions — is underdeveloped at the very best, and even in its nascent form it appears to be highly

22
unstable.
To move forward in the spirit of our final “question,” we must retrace our steps to where we first
began by highlighting the multitude of language formulated to delineate specific species and varieties of
greed. Now, having moved through the Republic and Politics, we see that the texts are deeply
preoccupied by the question of property, a reflection of their authors own preoccupation. In this historical
context, what can we know about property beyond what we have read? Turning to the portrayal of
Socrates’s Trial within Plato’s Apology, against his accusers Socrates retorts that the people of Athens
should be ashamed that their great city cares more for wealth and honor than wisdom and truth; closing
his speech he declares, “Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes but wealth and
everything else good for men, both individually and collectively” (Plato, Five Dialogues 30b). In a later
defense, Socrates attests to the fact that he has never taken payment for his service and that his accusers
could not bring one witness who could assert that he ever asked for, or took, pay. Socrates concludes,
“For, I suppose, I offer a sufficient witness that I speak the truth: my poverty” (Ibid. 31c). Even within the
Apology, through the voice of Socrates, we see a clear mistrust of wealth, but also a qualifier that
excellence is a prerequisite to wealth being a “good.” Again, we have no shortage of evidence that
suggests that ancient Greece and its philosophers were deeply engaged in a discourse on the nature of
property; yet, there is very little stable ground to find any sort of stance on the questions of exactly how
and why wealth and property corrupt.
Taking a step back, our engagement with Plato and Aristotle shows a profound insecurity around,
and discomfort with, relating to property that is embedded in the headwaters of Western thought. This
alone, in our journey towards property in its modern branded context, is an essential discovery. Within
these works, Plato and Aristotle are writing a philosophy that encompasses political and social theory;
both seek to imagine a society and a way of living that is best. The fact that the problem of property is
such a central element is intertwined with the fact that they are writing nothing short of a sociopolitical
treatise. Although with such a cursory investigation we can make no grand claims about any inherent
“unspeakability” around the human relationship to the world of owned things, but, at the very least we see
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that the problem of property and its articulation is nothing new. Although the discourse of property in
ancient Greece is not framed in the vocabulary of consumerism, it is framed in connection to a
fundamental human identity—desire and greed— nevertheless, there is a distinct unease and “silence”
around the nature of the commodity as a source of an almost mystical power. Thus, to see this as
testament to the fact that humans have struggled with the mysterious power of material as property since
our earliest records, just as they do now, is an essential point on its own. In our industrialized post-capital
world, it is easy to see material—property, commodity, brand, whatever you call it—as something new,
which in many ways it is, yet at the same time it is essential to recognize the greater history of the
instability and tensions of property as a central preoccupation of human thought.
Chapter 3- Kant’s Turn Towards the Individual as an Object
If Plato and Aristotle were acting as philosophical social theorists, imagining and formulating a
social and political way of life, they clearly did so on the broadest scale. They were building cities,
moving entire swaths of society into categorical boxes, and orchestrating whole social and political
systems. Here, by and large, property and individuals existed only in the abstract whole. In short, the
individual in all their particularities and social contexts was missing. Our project turns now to Kant
because he exemplifies and captures this paradigm of thought, far along the arc of time from the ancient
Greeks, that turns the eye of the thinker—the philosopher, the anthropologist, the social theorist—towards
the individual. For Kant, it appears that this begins with his initial engagement with anthropology, which
today is viewed to be the field of study that exemplifies privileging the particularity of the individual.
Kant was not entirely alone in his engagement with early anthropology, although it is notable that he was
one of the first. Beginning in the fall of 1772, Kant began holding lectures on anthropology while at
Albertus University of Königsberg, which continued until shortly before his retirement in 1776
(Foucault). Building on lecture notes and papers, Kant was believed to have spent 25 years writing the
first of his major treatises on what he called anthropology, titling the work “Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View” which was published in 1798 (ibid.). Within the text, Kant repeatedly frames
anthropology in systemic terms, referring to it as a “systemic doctrine” of the knowledge of mankind. It
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should be noted that, in his most formative years, Foucault was deeply—and seemingly singularly—
preoccupied with the notion of the experiential empiricism of the individual subject within Kant’s 1785
title Anthropology. Together with “Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique,” Kant’s
Anthropology served as the 24 thèse principale for his State Doctorate in 1960 (Bikley 81). Although,
Foucault’s work on Kant was presented as a secondary thesis in the company of Foucault’s seminal work
on Madness and Insanity, and, understandably, may have worked to overshadow the other, we should not
discount the significance of his engagement with Kant’s attempts at analyzing and establishing an
anthropology of mankind. Furthermore, the significance of Foucault choosing to engage with this
particular Kantian text, which never received major attention, should only further the importance in
examining Kant’s anthropology. Curiously, for both Kant and Foucault, these two respective texts
remained (and remain) some of their least discussed. This is evidenced poignantly by the fact that
Foucault’s 1964 text Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology was not translated into English until 2003 and
even then in the most informal circumstances, as the text was personally translated and published by
British academic Dr. Arianna Bove on “Generation-online,” a website Bove ran.
To summarize Foucault’s most salient engagement with Kant’s text, Foucault presents an analysis
that introduces Kant as a kind of originator of the idea of self-study or the study of the self as an empirical
object insofar as Kant presents the conditions of the possibility of experience as referred directly to the
empirical subject. Foucault then highlights a contradiction, which, formed as a question, asks us how
Kant’s presentation of subject (and in turn its conditions of possibility) as necessarily existing outside of
the chronology, as it is itself the starting point of knowledge — then, how could the subject be a starting
place for an understanding of knowledge? (Foucault, 60) Thus we have an oscillation, or at the very least
a tension, between knowing subject and known subject which, as expounded by Foucault, has direct and
explicit implications for anthropology.
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Yet, our focus here is not Foucault, but Kant and precisely what Kant did. To step away from the
Foucault connection and return to Kant’s Anthropology, we must return to the fact that Kant—at the
height of his career—was attempting to establish anthropology as its own autonomous discipline. As
Kalyniuk writes on Kant’s lectures, “Spanning a twenty-four year period, these lectures documented a
developing conception of anthropology with apparently ambiguous links to the entire critical project”
(Kalyniuk 98). Kant begins in his preface by highlighting the essentiality of the part in the whole, the
human being in “cultural progress.” True to its title, Kant’s approach is practical; he begins with the
human as object, “But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human
being: because the human being is his own final end.—Therefore to know the human being according to
his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the
world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth” (Kant, 3). By establishing the
human as an object—the most important—who is capable of perceiving the knowledge of the whole
whose sum is much greater than the sum of its parts, he moves to make the very basic idea of the practice
of anthropology possible. Following this move that establishes the singular human being as an object
capable of a “knowledge of the world,” Kant moves to present a doctrine to follow this new precedent,
writing, “A doctrine of knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can
exist either in a physiological or pragmatic point of view” (3). The pragmatic point of view is
distinguished from the physiological knowledge—which Kant dismisses totally—by virtue of its going
“beyond theory” as an engaged and embodied knowledge.
The salient characteristic of Kant’s vision for a pragmatic anthropology is an engagement with
the relational nature of the world; pragmatic anthropology only moves past a lesser theoretical knowledge
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when, “…it contains knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world” (4). Parsing the difference
between “to know the world” and “to have the world,” Kant differentiates simple “understanding” from a
deeper “participation” connected to “having” the world (4). Kant’s text continues in chapter I, beginning
with a detailed analysis of the practical faculty of the self, of the senses, memory, imagination, and of
cognition more generally. Here, his pragmatic vision of the anthropologist as a human object, almost as a
kind of tool, is reflected in the practical dimensions of his doctrine; he is simply attempting to equip the
individual with the knowledge and tools necessary for an engaged, embodied way of knowing that goes
beyond the superficiality of theory. Kant’s vision of anthropology may seem simplistic, as it very well
might be, but this is not out of any omission, but rather is a purposeful design. He notes the considerable
difficulty of arriving at a science that can account for the “considerable difficulties that are inherent in
human nature itself;” following this, he details the inherent flaws both in the observation of self and other,
noting that as soon as the other realizes he is being observed, he “…cannot show himself as he really is,”
and in the act of self-study the individual will reach a point where “dissimulation” and habit interfere
(ibid. 4). In short, the very act of observation renders it impossible to see how we or others “really” are, as
the act of observation inherently alters the observed. Thus, noting the difficulties inherent in grasping at
the questions of “actual” human nature, Kant turns towards establishing a pragmatic anthropology simply
defined as “a doctrine of the knowledge of human beings, systematically formulated” (3).
Situated firmly in the tradition of Enlightenment thought, Kant’s repositioning of the individual
as an object is an essential move that allows us to step into a new framework of thought with which to
engage the individual and property. Although Kant’s anthropology does not directly address property or
the kinds of questions surrounding material as directly as did the thinkers in our previous foray into
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ancient Greek Philosophy, Kant modernizes us and provides our project with an essential perspective,
while also strategically serving as a bridge between the “grander” projects of philosophy and a more
grounded and structured social theory. True to the individualistic paradigm of the Enlightenment, Kant
centers his anthropology around the individual part. Although all our three thinkers thus far were
occupied by a social project, in some key ways Kant’s treatment and methodology of the individual in
society is an inversion of both Plato’s and Aristotle’s formulation. Methodologically, Kant begins with
the individual, while Plato and Aristotle are constructing political systems that render the individual inert
insofar as they are only discussed, and only retain meaning, when they conform to their ordering. Here,
property and the problem of ownership can only coherently be constructed as a matter of policy, just as
the individual can only be approached as an abstract piece of a larger whole. Kant begins his
anthropology by freeing the individual from his bondage, objectifying him as an empirical object that is,
above all, knowable to himself. The individual that is knowable to himself is empowered as a critical
object that in turn possesses the ability to know the world. Even in the most abstract terms, it is clear that
as the individual becomes material, or for Kant, as the human being is objectified, the individual
simultaneously becomes both the means and the end of knowledge. It is this material objectification, or
making real, that allows the individual to recognize himself as simultaneously both an independent and a
relational being. For Kant’s anthropology, this is the starting place; through the objectification of the
individual, the individual sees himself as a part of a greater “knowledge of the world.” It is this individual
objectification, this making real, upon which Kant’s “manual” for anthropology is predicated. Inherent in
Kant’s project is a rejection of pure theory in favor of an engagement with the materiality of the “real.”
The objectification of self allows for the individual to engage in a dialectical and relational world,
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both internally and externally. As Foucault rightfully calls out and problematizes, Kant’s human being is
both the producer and product of their own knowledge, simultaneously a subject and an object.
Regardless of Kant’s place or legacy in the history of anthropology, he typifies the turn towards the
conception of self as a material and knowable object, a notion which he also demonstrates is essential to
the work of anthropology especially. Kant’s pragmatism is found not only in his purposefully limited
definition of anthropology, but also in his poignant observations regarding the difficulties inherent in any
effort to observe the self or observe the other. Regardless of the success of Kant’s anthropologic project,
in the spirit of his project of pragmatism, quite simply, Kant can be said to establish or embody the turn
towards a consideration of the individual as an object capable of engaging in a relational world. In
connection to our larger project, Kant establishes the primacy of the human being as an object that exists
relationally in a world of other objects (human or otherwise). This is not material, product, or commodity
as we typically think of it, but the human as object, which is a fundamental assertion upon which our
project is predicated, and thus it would be unwise to omit or take it for granted. And on that point, we
seem to have Foucault on our side.
With the individual as an object who exists in a relationally-structured world, we find ourselves in
a very different place, with entirely different analytical tools. The study of human beings emerged as a
science, and the human as an object of study emerged. The question of cultural divergence and similarity
was the primary interest of 19th-century scholars such as the anthropologists Tylor and Morgan, who
engaged in debates over whether cultural practice and belief was “diffused” or rather a product of
“independent invention.” Thus, ‘humankind’ and its culture becomes an object for study through the
double movement of invoking the logic of a universal nature, which, in turn, opens the door for the
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identification and deployment of “markers” which might be used to approach culture. If Kant enabled the
individual to become an object of study, then early anthropologists seized upon this new individual utility,
extending the knowability from the individual as object to humankind as object. Here, early
anthropologists are perhaps the best exemplars of this new way of thinking about the world: if we can
identify the individual as an object who exists relationally to other objects, then we have a foundation for
not just the study of the human as object, but humans—and their culture/society etc.—as an object of
study.
If the individual can’t be thought of as a knowable object in a relational world, then their
relationship with material objects—which have traditionally always retained their autonomy and objecthood—must necessarily remain inert. When the individual is empowered with their own objectivity, they,
at last, are fully able to relate to their world. When we are able to see the individual as an object, we can
see how they relate to other objects. Thus, it is this turn towards the objectification of the individual in a
relational—not so far from “objectified”—world, which paradigmatically allows for a world where the
individual becomes the focal point for social and political thought. In turn, the objectification of the
individual allows for a more precise engagement with the instability and clash of individual and product.
If Plato and Aristotle lacked—or were simply disinterested in— a framework to identify the precise
delineations between individual and product, Kant shows us that it is only in these particular moments or
formulations of instability that we can identify a fundamental character. Marx follows Kant in his
attention to the specific nature of the instability of individual and commodity.
Chapter 4- Marx and the Commodity
Having established a philosophic history of distinct developments and turns, with Marx we find
ourselves at a sort of philosophical resting point for our philosophical journey of tracing property—
perhaps even a kind of “ending.” It is with Marx that we have our two pieces meet: the individual and the
product. This is a synthesis of the “new” individual, the Kantian objectified individual, existing in a
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similarly objectified relational world and the external project. Marx gives us a new, more precise word
than the abstract product which we’ve been forced to use—the commodity. Thus, what we really have is
the union of the individual identity and the commodity. Following Kant, Marx operates in a metaphorical
“machine room” where the individual is a knowable object, just as that individual’s world is similarly
knowable and relational. Where Plato and Aristotle couldn’t exactly tell us where that problematic
product fit into the system, Marx has an answer. Just as Kant allows, Marx’s answer is predicated on a
dialectic between subject and object. It is with Marx’s 1867 Capital, and more specifically his chapter on
the commodity and his concept of commodity fetishism, that we find the spiritual headwaters of the
modern dominant discourse that engages with questions of the human relationship with material. As a
thinker, Marx stands on a strange rung on the ladder of time; as we see, he both reflects and encapsulates
so much of the philosophical thought that has come before him, yet he is also seen as a paradigmatic and
distinctly modern thinker. A kind of monument to our modern era of industrialized capitalism, Marx
looms and casts a shadow that stretches past the horizon. This is exactly what it means to say that Marx
very well could be a kind of “ending.” This aside, if you want to write about the relationship between
individual and commodity, you cannot avoid Marx; look there….you just used his word. In the scope of
this project, it seems that our move from Plato and Aristotle, to Kant, and now to Marx, is a natural
progression—even if it is a sped-up, “highlight reel.” Marx was the first to directly address the problem
of the individual and the product in our modern context—a response to the palpable tensions that I argue
have always existed—; likewise, he exemplifies and explodes the objectification of the individual that
Kant introduced. We find ourselves at Marx out of a necessity, which is exactly what makes him so
important. Equally importantly, a piece of writing is never an inert thing, and Marx’s Capital may well be
the most fitting exemplar of this. When discussing or analyzing Marx’s writing, we are also forced to
address its interpretations and entanglements and treat it like the thing it is—a living document. Thus,
while in some ways we are analyzing, for the most part we are interpreters who are necessarily forced to
make claims and arguments.
Turning directly to Marx’s famous conceptualization of commodity fetishism, a concept that is
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often repatriated and positioned, published in Marx’s 1867 Capital, we must assert that the text cannot be
uprooted from its context within Marx’s chapter on commodities, nor from its broader Marxist
framework. Marxian thought is predicated on the famous notion of base vs. superstructure, the notion that
means and relationship of material production —the base — informs and shapes the super-structure of
society that includes culture, institutions, power structures, and the state. As Marx writes in the 1959 A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, “In the social production of their existence, men
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production” (128).
Thus, the particular strain of alienation discussed within commodity fetishism exists within a broader
discourse of alienation which is not exclusively or exhaustively characterized within any single chapter.
That said, Marx positions the concept of commodity fetishism at the forefront of his text, speaking to its
undeniable essentiality. The beauty of Marx’s commodity fetishism is found in its immediate utility and
simplicity, as history has surely proven.
Fundamentally, Marx makes two moves: First, commodity fetishism is the perception of social
relationships involved in production, not as relationships among people, but as economic relationships
among money and commodities; second, commodity fetishism transforms the subjective, abstract nature of
political economy into something that is taken as objective or inherently valuable. Returning to the most
basic level with the commodity, which Marx defines as, “A commodity is, in the first place, an object
outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another;” a commodity
contains within it, “The utility of a thing makes it a use value” which is utterly abstracted in the act of
exchange (Marx, 173). Recognizing that commodities do not themselves contain any use value, Marx
turns to the “remaining common property” of the commodity, that it is a product of human labor. As
Marx summarizes in his final section on commodity fetishism,
There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There,
the existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value relation between the products of
labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical
properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation
between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order,
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therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the
religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings
endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in
the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which
attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which
is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities (165-6).
Thus, through the alienation of the commodity from anything physical or “knowable” in the logic of usevalue, within this void the commodity takes on a fetishistic quality. The sensual character of the product
has been erased, leaving only the social nature of things. Giving voices to the commodities at the close of
this section, Marx writes, “If commodities could speak, they would say: ‘Our use-value may interest
human beings; but it is not an attribute of us, as things. What is our attribute, as things, is our value. Our
own interrelations as commodities proves it. We are related to one another only as exchange values’”
(177). The commodity has become a schizophrenic, self-contradictory phenomena, a symbol of itself,
whose “being” and “meaning” are entirely at odds. Marx portrays the commodity as a kind of crude
“doppelganger,” the truly aesthetic artifact whose universal and particular would be authentically
harmonized (Eagleton 208-9). Thus, the opposite of the alienation of human labour would be a use-value
that makes sense, the exact opposite of the situation we have under capitalism with commodity fetishism.
Marx turns towards Robinson Crusoe as an exemplar of a relationship between human and object that is
“simple” and “intelligible,” while juxtaposing it with the “European Middle Ages shrouded in darkness,”
the historic turn from individual labor to communal (169). Thus, while Marx’s commodity fetishism
contains many constructive and critical technical elements, the thrust of his rhetorical project focuses on
commodity fetishism’s effect as the false universality of human labour that strips the sensuous qualities of
human labor to an entirely quantitatively-driven exchange value. Marx understands the commodity as a
kind of “false projection” or just falsification of material’s “true” or actual value, which is abstracted in
the act of alienating a product from its immediate value to the social world. Within an ideal world, a
material’s “universal,” or socially determined, and particular value would correlate. As we can
immediately see, the idea of fetishism that Marx picks up on goes beyond the problematic nature of
alienation and conflation of value — although this is its core — to a more general critique of the loss of
the subjective nature of an item’s economic value, and into what is thought to be an objective value.
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Marx’s commodity fetishism as just fetish is the perception of social relationships in the economic world
of production — not as relationships between people but as relationships between money and
commodity.
The most immediate problem with directly engaging with Marx’s section “The Fetishism of
Commodities and the Secret thereof” is its paradoxically asocial and apolitical nature, at least on a
technical level. Marx’s work is both social and political as a project, but within the first chapter “The
Commodity,” as Marx states at the beginning, his focus is not on the nature of the commodity as a human
“want” or how the object satisfies these wants; rather, Marx’s movement coalesces around a technical
treatment of commodity fetishism in the context of a critique of modern economic thought (125). Marx
speaks to a discourse in that he addresses both “political economy” and “modern economy” in the close of
his writing, “And modern economy, which looks down with such disdain on the monetary system, does
not its superstition come out as clear as noon-day, whenever it treats of capital? How long is it since
economy discarded the physiocratic illusion, that rents grow out of the soil and not out of society?” (176).
Here, in the conclusion of the three sections on “The Commodity,” Marx’s critical and technical project
of unmasking the commodity takes a very academic and technical turn, ending with the commodities
speaking through the mouth of the “economist” and presenting not a critique of the commodity itself, but
a parodistic critique of the economist’s commodities. Thus, while Marx implicitly presents a political and
social project and toolkit within his discussion of commodity fetishism, his true aims are much more
technical and academic. Marx chiefly positions himself here not as philosopher or politician, but as
critical economist. Recognizing this, we must then recognize that removing Marx’s conception of the
commodity from its context as technical treatment of economic principles requires some degree of
translation. The considerable dialectic legacy of commodity fetishism does not generally account for this
complexity. Marx deploys the fetishism of the commodity as a kind of performative thing; firstly, because
of the distinctly economic language of the commodity, the fetish serves as an arresting rhetorical reappropriation of the traditional context of the fetish. Secondly, because commodity fetishism more or less
defines itself in a circular motion, not only is his initial statement of “This I call Fetishism..” which more
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or less refers back to the act of production itself, as Marx follows, “This fetishism of commodities has its
origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labour that
produces them”(168). Thus, Marx’s commodity fetishism as its own conceptual unit, idea, or even word,
is somewhat questionable, as commodity fetishism more or less refers back to the commodity’s lack of
concrete properties or relations, which refers in turn to Marx’s general treatment of commodity. Marx
refers to the “Fetish character” of the commodity again in the conclusion, but this time uses it to describe
the “mode of production itself,” stating that “Hence its Fetish character is comparatively easy to be seen
through,” again demonstrating the different ways Marx engages with the Fetish (169). It could perhaps
best be defined as the apparent transformation of the subjective nature of commodities into an objective
nature, but this definition, too, seems to demand that the reader return to the specific nature of this
transformation. Thus, the tendency to refer to commodity fetishism as an abstracted concept rather than a
concept within a section (or better yet a concept in a section in a chapter), is a questionable, yet extremely
pervasive, practice.
These lesser points aside, Marx’s Capital and especially the concept of commodity fetishism
served as a paradigmatic text that reframed and profoundly shaped a whole litany of intellectual and
academic discourse. On a most basic level, it served as a foundational text for engaging with the modern
capitalist economic reality, offering the commodity—and its fetishism—as a starting place for a whole
new way of categorizing and engaging the social, political, and economic. As stated before, Marx’s move
to establish the commodity as the central object of study in Marxist discourse served as a break—a
distinct move towards a new engagement with material/property, — putting forward a new starting place
and shaping a new discourse. The impact and influence of Marx’s commodity fetishism was immediate
and sweeping. György Lukács in his 1923 History and Class Consciousness takes as his starting point the
theory of commodity fetishism for the development of his concept of “reification.” Commodity fetishism
was theoretically central to the Frankfurt School, with Horkheimer and Adorno being the best exemplars
with their 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment. Guy Debord’s 1967 The Society of the Spectacle applied
commodity fetishism to the “spectacle” of mass media.” In Semiotics, Jean Baudrillard, in his 1968 work
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The System of Objects, sought to develop and modernize Marx’s commodity fetishism by shifting away
from Marx’s privileging of production, to the subject of consumerism — the list could go on… In short, it
would not be too bold to say that commodity fetishism and its legacy has been one of the more impactful
concepts across the social sciences. Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School are more or less predicated
on Marx’s commodity fetishism as a starting place. Just as commodity fetishism established a new
groundwork foundation, it also in turn provoked compelling divergences as the concept was critically
engaged, adapted, and reimagined.
That being said, as a project concerned with the nature of branded commodities and identity, we
owe Marx a great debt for galvanizing a whole new discourse. However, at the same time, the dominance
of Marx’s influence necessarily has its own problems, particularly for our project, in its privileging of the
analysis of the commodity over the individual. In Marx’s initial definition, “A commodity is, in the first
place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another”
(125). While Marx goes on to disprove the “antisocial” nature of the commodity within his first chapter,
showing us that the commodity is actually a socially-constructed thing, he still leaves the individual with
almost no agency (125). It is fair to say that Marx is also critical of how the individual is robbed of their
agency; however, Marx’s overwhelming focus on the commodity over the individual is a significant move
with powerful implications— intentional or not. Although Marx is concerned with the commodity as it is
connected to human labor, he focuses, however, on the “thing” and not on the individual wanting the
“thing.” The thing’s value is rooted in the social, but Marx is absolutely not interested in talking about
why the individual wants that thing, or even mapping how the individual precisely relates to the thing.
Again, the individual is ground under the machinery of the commodity. Furthermore, we cannot uproot
this privileging of economy from Marx’s larger project of historical materialism and the basic
conceptualization of a directional relationship between base and superstructure, with the former
constituting the latter. Here, the individual as a product of their economic conditions lacks agency; their
relationship with the economic world of commodity, labor, and consumption is a relationship of
powerlessness. Thus, despite the fact that Marx is criticizing the conventional notion of the commodity as
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the dominating force, he can be accused of having singlehandedly steered the intellectual approach
concerning the relationship between the individual and the commodity down one distinct avenue — an
approach that overwhelmingly situated the commodity and its consumption over the individual as the
dominant force. This is the case because the most popular and widely-engaged treatments of Marx’s
Commodity and the concept of commodity fetishism came directly either from the Marxist tradition, or the
Marxist-influenced schools of Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School. True of both academia and
broader popular culture, the commodity, mass-culture, consumerism, and the concept of brand, were
inevitably tainted from the very beginning. Thus, the legacy of Marx and his commodity fetishism set the
tone for a dominant discourse on commodity, consumption and brand, as dictatorially acting upon the
individual.
Thus, commodity fetishism and its influence has, in many ways, moved beyond Marx’s project
and even, as we suggested earlier, the particular way Marx deployed and engaged commodity fetishism.
That being said, while this framing is necessary to critically engage with Marx’s text, it cannot be allowed
to overshadow how our project critically engages with commodity fetishism. On a most basic level, Marx
gives us the language of the commodity, where the previously vague product takes form as a relational
item of economic exchange. The language of the commodity clarifies the inherently relational and
therefore (primarily) economic nature of the product, not only modernizing the vocabulary of material,
but, more importantly, cementing its definition in its nature as a relational thing. Here the commodity and
its properties exist in an inherently social dialectic. Here, Marx establishes not only the possibility, but
also the necessity, of critically engaging with the relationship between the social and the material, the
individual and the commodity. Marx sets the foundation for any discourse concerning either the
commodity or the social. Thus, Marx must be taken as a foundation, something that must be built upon—
as the text itself suggests. It seems as important to identify what the Marxian project does not do with the
commodity as what it does. Commodity fetishism identifies the central problem of the commodity as the
fact that the use value—the physical properties of the commodity and the human needs it fulfills—is
“abstracted” into an exchange value in the framework of the capitalist marketplace. As Marx illustrates,
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money takes the form of this equivalence and hides the true equivalence of exchange—labor. As he
writes, “Now we know the substance of value. It is labour. We know the measure of its magnitude. It is
labour time” (130). Thus, Marx never explicitly bridges this gap between the commodity and its agency,
because, for Marx, the commodity as we find it in modern capitalism is so abstracted and alienated that it
lacks any substance. The commodity has an agency or an “essential nature,” that of its labor; however, the
“truth” or “agency” of the commodity is so fully abstracted that it seems to remain only as a theoretical
thing.
In the spirit of recognizing Marx’s work on the nature of the commodity as a project of grounding
or mapping, it demands that we go beyond the confines of the text itself and critically engage with the
toolkit Marx provides. Turning to critical questions, commodity fetishism and Marx’s works more
broadly—despite their preeminence—fail to link the commodity to “marketing,” even in its earliest
stages. Already in 18th-century England, advertisements had become a fixture of English newspapers, and
were a trend that progressed rapidly. Branded packaging and public advertising in the form of posters and
leaflets became commonplace. France, too, quickly followed suit, with paid advertisements becoming the
norm in the marketplace. Thus, while Marx certainly didn’t live through the most explosive growth spurts
for advertising, he certainly lived in an environment where advertising and other forms of marketing were
very pervasive and clearly exerting a significant role over the marketplace, the consumer and material
itself. Yet, to my knowledge Marx never once addresses the subject and I can think of no answer as to
why. While within The Commodity Marx provides a cutting-edge groundwork for engaging the new
economic and social realities of industrial capitalism, he never explicitly addresses the bridge between the
commodity as a meaningless abstracted thing and the modern world of exchange, where it is re-animated.
Thus, in the modern exchange market, Marx shows us that the true meaning of the commodity is alienated
and abstracted, yet at the same time the commodity takes on a new life as an exchange value. The
commodity, no matter how inauthentic, is still an agentic thing insofar as it is given a cultural and
economic meaning. Yet Marx, wholly preoccupied with the abstraction and alienation of the commodity
in its most basic economic form, stops short of addressing the alienation of the commodity in a more
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modern cultural context. Again, this comes as a surprise, as Marx was very much preoccupied with the
specific mechanisms utilized by bourgeois capitalism to influence and control the everyday lives and
economic realities of the proletariat working class.
We would argue that commodity fetishism is not fashioned for, nor was ever intended to speak to,
the reality of marketed and branded commodities—in short, the “modern” post-industrial commodity.
This is not an argument that is critical of Marx’s project, but rather its interpretations and legacy. The
move from the commodity as a fetish, which converts the product into value, “It is value, rather, that
converts every product into a social hieroglyphic” which, “Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic,
to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as
much a social product as language” (ibid. 173). Thus, the product becomes naturalized, ahistorical, and
immutable in the eyes of the consumer. As Marx’s principal concern is the alienation of individual labour
in society, he takes it as a given, and thus does not directly discuss the essential nature of the product and
its social function as an object of meaning. Marx’s concern with the alienation of man from the product of
his labor directly points to his principal concern with the product (and its labor) as a site of meaningmaking, but within commodity fetishism he does not directly address it, although it appears implicitly and
explicitly as a central concern. Thus, as Marx states in the first lines of his chapter on the Commodity, his
concern is not in locating where the “want” of the commodity originates, or whether the commodity
satisfies these wants; therefore, commodity fetishism can only stand as a foundation for the larger
questions about the how and why of the commodity. The question of the marketing, branding, and
ultimate meaning of the commodity as a social object forces us to move beyond Marx and address a new
reality of the commodity.
Marx is astute in identifying that the commodity always speaks to an individual “want;”
however, in our modern context we must bifurcate this notion of commodity as it relates to the “want,”
into product—or commodity—and “brand.” The product and its brand are not easily separated; they only
exist when paired with one another. A product cannot exist without the externalization of some kind of
social identity imposed upon it. A product can exist without an agentic brand, but it will have an identity
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or social meaning projected upon it, regardless. This functions as a kind of proto-brand, as it lacks the
agency and intentionality inherent in “branding” a product, but retains the essential nature of brand in that
it remains as a social meaning paired to a product; a crude analogy: product is the body, and the brand is
the soul. You can have a zombie form without a real soul or essence. On a basic working level, a brand
requires some degree of intentionality, no matter how nascent or even unconscious. A product without a
brand is a product that is mute and inert. The relationship between product and brand is not a relationship
where the brand makes meaning from the product where there was previously none, but a relationship that
expresses and clarifies the voice of a product. Thus, on the most simplistic level the brand functions as a
projective vehicle, an externalization or expression that clarifies—to use Marx’s language—how the
commodity speaks to the individual’s wants. Brand must be thought of principally as a vehicle of
externalization. While Marx recognizes that the commodity exists only insofar as it speaks to an
individual “want,” he disregards—or is simply disinterested—in the nature of this relationship. The
degree to which a commodity or product satisfies a “human want” is directly related to the efficacy with
which the commodity presents itself as capable of fulfilling our want. Modernizing this notion, Marx
suggests that a commodity exists only by its property as something that is “wanted,” but it is the brand
which gives voice to the modern commodity as something that is an object of “want” or “need” or even,
as Marx allows, a “fancy.” Thus, even Marx, by portraying the commodity as something that exists only
through its property as capable of satisfying a human “want,” points us towards an investigation of brand.
As Marx argues that the “authentic” and “true” nature of the physical human relationship with the
commodity—be it in the form of a “want” or not—is abstracted and alienated, it doesn’t appear as much
of a leap to suggest that modern marketing seeks to fill this liminal void of meaninglessness that exists
between the individual and the commodity. On all fronts, it appears that marketing, specifically giving
commodity a brand, seeks to produce the very means that Marx suggests is lost in the obscuring of labor
relations. As noted above, if the commodity is already abstracted and fetishized, given a meaning that
does not reflect its true use value, then it seems that in marketing a commodity we are fetishizing a fetish.
The narrative that the brand constructs around the commodity has no relation to any Marxian qualities of
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the commodity itself; the Marxian commodity is an empty thing that inherently requires an intervention.
This time it is not an intervention of exchange that equivocates one commodity with another, but a more
basic intervention of injecting meaning into the abstracted and alienated commodity. With this added
element, we can see yet another layer of alienation and abstraction to Marx’s commodity that is a
distinctly modern fixture: the commodity is produced, taken from its makers, and thus loses any sense of
use value—the first alienation— it enters into the world of exchange—the second alienation—and in this
world of rote exchange the commodity’s emptiness demands that it be given some sort of meaning—the
third alienation— wherein the brand steps in. Marx may never address marketing or brand, but in
establishing the rupture of the commodity as it is torn from its mooring and thrust into a world of
exchange, Marx creates a void of meaninglessness that must inevitably be filled. From a Marxian angle,
as a consumer of alienated commodities, the brand steps in as an antidote to alienation and
meaninglessness; it provides a fabricated narrative that endows a meaning and relationship with
commodity.
Thus, in my mind, despite the fact that commodity fetishism lays the groundwork for any approach
that addresses the commodity as an abstracted and socially-mediated thing whose “true nature”—that of
its labor, or actual “use value”— does not encapsulate what the commodity truly is, and, therefore, does
not directly apply to our modern consumerist society: a modern consumerist society where the delineation
between the commodity and the brand is so uncertain that often the commodity itself seems to disappear.
This could be articulated as yet another layer of fetishizing, where the commodity and its identity are
abstracted beyond the original fetish of the commodity itself. Yet, this would be going beyond Marx.
Marx gives us the language of alienation and abstraction; in short, he shows us the void between the use
value—the “true” nature of the commodity—and the world where it becomes an empty object of
exchange. Marx has provided us a framework for thinking about brand as a thing that appears to fill the
void and give meaning to the commodity. If the commodity is abstracted in capitalist exchange, then
surely the commodity is doubly abstracted when what meaning it has as a physical object of exchange is
subsumed by brand. If Marx’s criticism within commodity fetishism can be boiled down to its most
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simplistic articulation — as it often is —, it is that the perception of social relations involved in
production have come to appear not as social relationships between people, but economic relationships of
exchange. The commodity transforms the sensual human subjectivity of the thing, into an objective
economic “thing” with intrinsic value. The brand is an invention that is directly attributed to the
commodity as an object of exchange, but an attribute that seeks to reinvent the sensual social nature of
exchange that has been lost. In short, brand seeks to fill the void created by the rupture of social meaning
and economic meaning. Thus, existing in this unstable place of rupture, and standing between the
consumer and the commodity, we find the alchemy of the brand, which presents the possibility of
reinventing the alienated and abstracted commodity.
As much as Marx does to modernize the philosophical and social discourse of the commodity, not
to mention his placement of the commodity as a living social and political creature, within this we can
still clearly see the fundamental philosophical product that Plato and Aristotle grappled with, and its
supreme instability. Again, Marx’s most basic conception of the commodity, which appears within the
first lines of his great volume Capital, is the same fundamental philosophical “definition” of the salient
nature of property and its problems — that it exists in a human social world as a “want.” Here, from Plato
and Aristotle to Marx, the problem of the property exists as a fundamental, as well as a seemingly apriori, thing. For Plato and Aristotle, the question of property is inseparable from the socio-political
realities of human life, just as for Marx the question of the commodity as existing in response to a “want”
is a-priori. Just as Plato and Aristotle struggle to identify the essential nature of the problem that is
inherent in the relationship between the individual and property, Marx brushes this question aside in a
similar fashion in the beginning of Capital, writing, “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside
us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants,
whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference” (125). Thus,
even across the great expanse of philosophical thought that separates Plato and Aristotle from Marx, the
question concerning why the product or commodity relationship is such a difficult or inarticulable thing is
a constant. Marx may claim that the nature of this “want” makes no difference, although his project sets a
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framework that demands that the nature of the “want” is essential. Marx’s legacy and the great body of
work that sprung from his conception of the commodity—notably the Frankfurt School and the tradition
of Critical Theory — concerns itself directly with this “want.” Fundamentally, it is essential to highlight
that our journey through the philosophy concerning property is certainly a journey of progression and
evolution that culminates, in many ways, in Marx’s “explosion” of the commodity; however, we still see
that the same fundamental philosophical instabilities and tensions surrounding property survive this long
journey—although now they appear in a wholly different light.
Chapter 5- Synthesis: Philosophy to Brand
Surveying our journey through some of the most important philosophical thought that concerns
property, we see that Marx brings us to a new place, where he offers what is perhaps the clearest and most
powerful definition of property, in which the commodity is a thing outside of us that satisfies a human
want. Here, in more explicit terms, Marx is referring to the same kind of product that preoccupied Plato
and Aristotle, the same properties of the product as a social object possessing a distinct meaning or
identity. The essential problem of the commodity seems to be rooted in the inherent mystery; the product
or the commodity is a kind of chimera because it is a tangible physical object, with an intangible meaning.
This meaning is as fluid as the hearts and minds of the human, the social, the cultural, and the economics,
that actively create the commodity. Today, we are either oblivious or we pretend to have made peace with
this fact of life, and often pretend that we have “tamed” the commodity, or at least attempted to
domesticate its inherent tensions. Now, the emergence of marketing and the language of brand is the
major factor. In the modern marketplace, the social meanings of commodities are harnessed with brand in
an attempt to control and sculpt the meaning of the commodity in its social context. Companies endeavor
to tame the chimera of the commodity by giving it a meaning and identity—a brand. As our project
unfolds, we will more directly address this “manipulation” of the commodity through the mechanism of
branding, but for now our focus must remain introspective in its treatment of the commodity. What our
philosophical journey has yielded is an essential definitional foundation for engaging the commodified
property — that it is a thing that exists “outside” of us that we give meaning and value to. We see that
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philosophy has identified the salient characteristic of the product or commodity to be its social meaning,
its brand. Most importantly, philosophical thought has allowed us to approach the alchemy that is the
brand and see its chimeric character — a thing that appears so naturalized and basic in the human
imagination, yet simultaneously intangible. The thing, the commodity, has no meaning in and of itself. It
is only when it is married with the intangible meanings of the social world that the object becomes
something articulable. Thus, philosophy has not only shown us that the true nature of the commodity is
found in its social meaning—its brand—, but also the essential instability of this social meaning, this
territory within which modern brand marketing attempts to assert itself.
Our journey through the realm of philosophical thought concerning property and the commodity
has established an essential foundation for our project: the inherent instability of the relational space that
brand seeks to occupy, between commodity and consumer/producer. The dominant understanding of what
brand does must be destabilized in order to make space for a brand framework that engages with
instability. Yet, before proceeding, to engage this instability, we must establish a cursory working
definition of brand. It is essential to our project that we recognize that the vocabulary of brand is a
relatively recent conceptualization of material (commodity/product or otherwise) identity. As we have
already presented, product—especially commodified material—has always had brand, that is, it has
always had some kind of identity or socially constructed meaning attached to it. A thing is never just a
thing; a material thing always has a dialectical relationship between itself and the social world. The
material thing is neither fully constructed nor constructive of its social meaning; rather, it is always
situated within a dialectical relationship. Thus, in the most general sense, brand is simply the most
modern articulation and conceptualization of the identity and meaning of the material thing, albeit one
that is distinctly tied to the advent of the commodity. This must not come at the expense of the
essentiality of analyzing brand as a new and modern conceptualization of material identity; however, it is
of the utmost importance that we recognize that brand in its precursory forms has always existed as a
fixture in the social and phenomenological experience of being human in a material world. What is
important here is that material must ultimately be given meaning. Even though material has its own nature
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that works to construct this meaning, ultimately we see the social project of human existence as making
and giving meaning to the world—an inherently unstable undertaking. Thus, to engage with the material
world is to engage with brand insofar as brand is the embodiment of this projection, or externalization, of
meaning-making. This is not to say that this meaning-making is analogous with brand, but that brand
exists within this broader framework. We must acknowledge that brand, as it functions, exists only within
commodified objects or products, and thus the vocabulary of brand comes into being only in the company
of the commodity.
In the modern marketplace, brands are created and “given”—marketed—to the consumer, who in
turn create and give meaning to the brand—a relationship that necessarily comes with tensions,
“slippages,” and re-articulation. The core idea is that brand offers leverage in the marketplace that
corporations and other actors have realized is powerful, and which simultaneously allows them access
into the consumer’s world and values. This is a modern development, a modern destabilization. In the
simplest terms, the construction of brand is an attempt to create a narrative that is meaningful on multiple
levels and for multiple stakeholders (customers, marketers, corporations, etc.). On the most basic level,
brand is a dimensionalized essence or identity that attempts to encode an evocative range of associations,
promises, and imagery which illuminate and extol both the product and the user. On a higher and more
emotional level, the brand offers and seeks to create a relationship; it attempts to create a sphere of shared
relevance. Here, the brand functions as the locus for the relationship between material product and the
consumer. We do not innately have “relationships” with products per se — candy bars, beverages,
cellphones, or cars. Yes, we recognize we need them, but it is at the level of the brand that the locus of the
relational bond is created and solidified. Mastercard and Visa are absolutely identical in terms of their
product features; it falls to brand to create and communicate meaningful essence and identity differences.
Here, the brand presents itself as the gatekeeper between the product and the consumer; the brand makes
or transforms a material thing into a branded product, into something recognizable and articulable. The
brand helps augment the product into an object with an identity complete with associations, promises and
imagery that are consumed just as the product is. In turn, the branded object offers an experience, utility
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and the fulfillment of a want. Here, brand gives voice to products, while also giving voice to the
consumer. Thus, as with any material, brand is constructed by, and constructive of, its consumers. This
returns us to the fundamental instability of the brand: that it exists only as a relational thing. Just as a rote
commodity, such as gold, has a rich and layered history of a cultural meaning that is, in many ways, a
constant renegotiation of relationship, be it social or economic, the brand functions in a similar way. A
commodity’s brand is never a stable thing; rather, it is constantly created and recreated by the relationship
between brand and the consumer. It is in this tension and instability — this ever-shifting, complex, and
layered web of relationships between brands and consumers — that we find the definition of what brand
is.
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SECTION II- Anthropology of Brand: Situating the Brand

Chapter 1- A Brief Journey to the Modern Brand
Having established and traced the historic philosophical engagement with individual and commodity,
we were led to a definition of brand as existing within—and because of— the void between commodity
and consumer. We were also introduced to the conception of the modern brand as a vehicle for identity
and meaning existing in the unstable relationship between individual and consumer. However, while we
have the beginnings of a framework, we have only begun to understand and engage brand. Our previous
section ended by positing that the true nature of brand must be found only in its dynamic relational
engagement, calling for our project to ground itself in the particularities of the brand relationship in order
to understand it. In short, our philosophical investigation of brand has led directly to the necessity of a
grounded anthropologically-ethnographic and analytical treatment of brand. The movement of this section
brings us closer to a more intimate engagement with brand, with each step revealing a new characteristic.
Beginning with establishing our project’s methodological basis, we move to engage critically with the
discourse surrounding brand, before responding with our own formulation of brand both in its theoretical
and ethnographically-grounded forms.
As previously mentioned, the language of brand, as well as its proliferation as a fixture of the
commodity, is a distinctly modern thing. Most economic historians connect the emergence of brand to the
rise of the mass-produced factory goods during the Industrial Revolution, where individual consumers
had, previously, only been familiar with primarily locally-produced goods. As mass-produced goods
increasingly found themselves competing in the territory previously dominated by the familiar and local
products, the brand—complete with packaging and advertising— emerged as a way to convince
consumers that these mass-produced products were as trustworthy as the locally-produced goods which
they were accustomed to (Arons). The first exemplars of this come from packaged-goods manufacturers:
Pearl’s soap, Campbell’s Soup, Coca-Cola, Aunt Jemima, Quaker Oats, etc. (ibid.). In short, while not all
historians use the language of “trust”—although it is common—, these new foreign products could not
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outright compete with the local product because they lacked anything that would differentiate themselves
from the local products which consumers trusted and understood (ibid). Here we see playing out exactly
the phenomenon that we discussed in relation to Marx—the brand must fill the void with meaning. The
meaning, and thus favorability, of the locally-produced product was self-evident; only through attempting
to construct an analogous narrative of meaning via brand could the mass-produced product prevail. The
relationship of the consumer to the locally-produced goods was apparent, an age-old economic fact;
however, the mass-produced product had no such intrinsic relationship, and thus attempted to construct a
branded narrative and meaning as something that could act as a relational object. Pearl’s soap is heralded
as being one of the first fully-fledged brands. Thomas J. Barratt joined Pearl’s in 1865, and could be said
to be the first “brand manager” (ibid.). Pearl’s soap fulfilled important components of marketing that
remain as relevant as ever: product recognition — Pearl’s soap was the first translucent soap,
differentiating it from all other soaps sold at the time — and identity, combining its distinctive visual
identity with a slogan-based advertising campaign that positioned the soap as a kind of status symbol.
Most importantly, it may have been the first brand that can be identified as recognizing the power in
leveraging status relating to brand; Pearls’s 1865 advertising tapped into a racist cultural narrative,
including the now iconic—and at that time much copied—ad where a black boy is “cleaned” into a white
boy (ibid.). Explicitly leveraging racist notions exemplifies this elitist brand message: cultivated people
with taste and status choose Pearl’s soap.
While Pearl’s may have been ahead of its time, by all accounts it seems that by the mid-1940’s
manufacturers began to recognize that consumers were developing actual relationships with their products
— relationships that existed both in the cultural and individual sense (ibid.). In the 1950’s, companies
such as Procter and Gamble, General Foods, and Unilever, were responsible for catalyzing the brand as a
business element of the company by creating the role of “brand manager” (ibid.). What is notable here is
the fact that it took a fairly significant amount of time for companies to recognize the utility, or even the
necessity, of attempting to manage their brands. What this tells us is that it was the consumer, more than
the company itself, who elevated the importance of the brand. Certainly the brand in its earliest form was

48
an attempt to create an identity capable of competing with locally-produced products, but what elevated
brand to something that needed to be managed was the slow realization that consumers were creating their
own meanings and relationships with products on their own. Thus, in some ways, it was the consumer
who took the first bite of the forbidden apple, even if the corporation was the snake. Companies then
realized that brand was a valuable component of their offering in and of itself, something that could not
simply be left to the minds of the consumers. From this point forward, we witness an explosion of brand,
especially in the 1990’s, as retailers realized that brand could be leveraged with more acuity and to great
effect. This was essentially the move from the brand as a singular thing, such as a commodity or
company, to brand in a more general sense (ibid). Retailers followed the example set by the packagedgoods manufacturers, and created marketing departments. Moreover, retailers realized that, by creating
and leveraging the brands of the products they sold, they could not only make more money but also
improve their own retail brand’s value (ibid).
Fast-forward to the 21st century: we’ve developed from a notion of brand as attributable to a
single company and not much more, to the explosion of brand as a thing to be leveraged at every
opportunity—the average Western consumer sees 3,000 brand messages a day. Today, brand is more
prolific than ever. Even within the theory of marketing, brand retains a special ring to it, even as it is the
subject of hundreds of business-related books, and forms an essential part of the core component of the
modern curriculum of marketing education. The word resists simplistic categorization, which is exactly
what makes it so enigmatic and fascinating. Yet, while the business world continues to delve into the
practical and superficial applications of brand, the other, deeper and more elusive, side of the brand
remains—with some exceptions— largely ignored. Here, our project deploys the dichotomy of deep vs.
superficial, primarily to denote the degree to which the intimate and situated agentic individual consumer
is engaged, or not. As we come to see, it is easy to treat brand as a superficial theoretical phenomena
without any real depth in considering the individual consumer’s context.
Chapter 2- Methodology and an Introduction to the Focus Group
In Urban and Koh’s 2013 article Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations,
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perhaps the only anthropological attempt at an ethnography of the corporation, the first line begins by
stating, “Ethnographic research approaches modern business corporations from two directions: from the
inside, as if corporations were analogous to the small-scale societies anthropologists traditionally studied;
and, from the outside, as actors affecting and transforming the world” (Urban & Koh, 140). Here, my
project is deeply concerned with an ethnographic approach towards the corporate, as brand often
“subsumes” corporate identity (for example, people don’t often link the brand Pepsi to its company,
Pepsico). Thus, I fall within neither of these approaches, but rather rest somewhere in the middle. In my
project, I draw upon a unique perspectival role as an academic who is seeking to understand brand on an
intellectual and academic level through my experiences, as well as the learning that I have attained as a
brand strategist who has worked with the marketing of brands in the world of business. Our
anthropological project is an amalgamation of these two approaches to brand: an individual who studies
the discourse and theory of the brand at a distance, and the marketer who actively participates in the
creation, interpretation, and management of brand in a situated business context. In fact, it is important to
state that our project is possible only through this amalgamation, for only by engaging the anthropological
discourse of brand with personal experience and analysis are we able to engage brand on a deeper level,
and produce a new analytical framework for understanding and engaging brand.
For the past three years I have worked in the world of marketing as an independent consultant on
both a national and international scale for Fortune 500 corporations that range from media companies to
packaged goods brands. In this capacity I have worked on projects that, broadly, seek to strategically
position or reposition a brand: projects that examine the landscape of the marketplace, looking for a
potential openings for consumer needs, wants and desires, as well as more general projects that seek to
understand and analyze the consumer in relation to specific themes. In short, while “strategic brand
positioning” may be the simplest description of the work, it omits the significant difference in foci that is
unique to each specific project, as well as the kind of “learning” that is sought. On a basic level, the goal
is always to try to understand the consumer, largely by inviting both rational and imaginal framing
exercises to draw out their perceptions and attitudes. In the most general sense, the work does not begin
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with a question like “How do you use X in your everyday life,” but rather, understanding (on a
necessarily cursory level) how the consumer understands and sees themselves in the current cultural
moment. To understand the role of specific commodities and brands, one must first have some sense of
who the consumer is as an individual, or how they represent themselves as an individual.
My field work is essentially comprised of the body of experience and observations I have
accumulated in my work; my field notes are the hundreds of pages of notes I have taken, as well as the
deliverable presentations and reports I have contributed to. Admittedly, not all of this work was done
while I was actively working on a particular project, yet taken together they contribute equally to the body
of knowledge I have to draw upon. This is, of course, not fieldwork in the traditional sense; a critic could
argue that it lacks the required depth and intimacy of engagement entailed in fieldwork. While I will
admit to some unorthodoxy, these claims are easily refuted. If fieldwork aims to come to a deep
understanding that encompasses an insider’s perspective, I would argue that, on all points, the work that I
have done approaches both a deep and insider perspective in a uniquely powerful way. While projects
have their own specific aims and demand that we deliver our employer a report that fulfills the “learning”
goals for the project set forth, it is not as if my deeper brand “learning” does not carry over, cumulatively,
into every other project. In fact, in our work it is imperative that each project be as specific as it must be,
while being simultaneously grounded in a broader field of deep and accumulated cultural knowledge of
how brand works in different stratified consumer markets, more generally. If it were anything otherwise,
it would be akin to starting at zero with every project. Thus, while it may be true that any single two-week
project could not be considered fully-fledged fieldwork, when taken as a whole it does represent a
significant body of experience accumulated through three years of work, which is undeniably an
“anthropological” fieldwork of brand and consumer relations.
Again, the methodological context of this project is the analysis of experience, observation,
notes, correspondences, and reports, across three years of work. Here, our object of study is not a stable,
situated thing; rather, brand is the opposite. Certainly one could take a more traditional fieldwork
approach to marketing and brand and embed themselves within a specific brand or corporation, or write
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an historical account of how a certain product or brand came to cultural prominence. But all of these
approaches will yield only a limited understanding of how a particular brand operates in one context. I do
not mean to diminish this kind of approach; certainly there is significant learning about brand that can be
gleaned. However, to attempt to investigate and understand brand as it operates in a more general or
universal way, instead of a singular and specific way, we must find a research methodology that can
match the chimeric, dynamic, and atemporal nature of brand. As a key site of ethnographic research, the
methodology of the focus group is uniquely positioned to address these questions.
The focus group has long been a fixture of modern market research, seen by corporations to be a
unique site to theory-craft brand and product. While individual marketers and marketing agencies do
carry out what is most often called a “home visit,” where an individual or a family is observed in their
own space interacting with a branded product, the focus group remains the prominent tool of market
research, at least on the qualitative side. This is due to the prevailing belief that it is possible to gain
intimate knowledge of the consumer through a series of tailored focus groups; in short, the focus group is
seen to provide the highest return on investment for marketers looking to better understand their
consumers. As Kratz writes in his 2010 article In and Out of Focus—the only anthropological article I
could find that directly addresses and analyses the phenomena of the focus group—an article about the
focus group phenomena using several development projects as case studies, Kratz writes “They [focus
groups] are seen as a source of information to help interpret and explain quantitative surveys, a means of
eliciting statements and narratives about personal experiences and attitudes, and a discovery procedure to
identify recurrent themes and idioms relevant to a research topic. Part of the battery of “rapid methods”
for evaluation and assessment, focus groups are both faster to implement and less expensive than
ethnography…” (1). It must be noted that, while there are many different forms of ethnographic research,
in my project when I refer to “ethnography” I am referring to the specific tradition of culturalanthropology, ethnographic fieldwork that insists on an intimate embeddedness of the anthropologist and
their analysis. Kratz also identifies the various frictions within anthropology’s engagement with the focus
group as an ethnographic method, going as far as to separate the focus group from traditional ethnography
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even while illuminating their shared qualities and goals. He writes, “Focus groups and ethnographic
research alike are grounded epistemologically in communication and social interaction—they produce
knowledge through various kinds of discursive engagement and other modes of communication” (ibid 2).
While Kratz belies mainstream anthropology’s reluctance to engage with the focus group or even allow it
to be considered under the umbrella of ethnography, within his article he nonetheless calls for
anthropology, as a field, to engage critically with the focus group in the same way as any other
ethnographic sites of knowledge production. Writing on the reflexive turn in anthropology, “But critical
attention at the time seldom is extended to reexamining communicative structures and processes
embedded in basic methods and the ways they might shape knowledge production. Regarding research
methods simply as ready-made tools belies the uncertainty and openness intrinsic to qualitative research
and to the production of ethnographic knowledge through communicative interaction” (ibid 2). Thus,
because the essential “material” of our project is a direct product of the focus group, it is essential that—
as Kratz highlights—we engage the focus group not as simply a ready-made tool but rather a unique site
of knowledge production that can be understood and analyzed ethnographically.
An important distinction must be made here; Kratz, as well as others who write about the focus
group, are attempting to construct a generalizable model of how the focus group operates across different
contexts. While this has undeniable value, it also contains an inherent tension. Kratz is attempting to
analyze and assess the focus group in an anthropological context with the explicit goal of revealing some
sort of essential character inherent in the focus group as a methodology, while at the same time
acknowledging that the structure and process of each focus group has its own unique context. This stands
in opposition to our project, as mentioned above, as our work cannot begin to engage analytically with the
focus group beyond the specific way that my company conducts focus groups. Illustrating more tension
between our projects, Kratz cites another researcher on the business side of the focus group, who writes,
“Marketing literature is clear that focus group participant structure incorporates hierarchy: ‘One of the
main reasons that focus groups work … is that the moderator is the authority figure’” (7). Here, while I
cannot speak for other marketers conducting focus groups, I can say that the way our company conducts
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focus groups stands in direct opposition to this. From the start, our focus groups are designed to subvert
authority from the individual moderator “leading” the discussion and disperse it among the participants.
As I will later establish, the success of our focus groups are predicated on the individual participant seeing
themselves as an authoritative voice, an expert who is specifically selected and paid to share their
experiences and ideas. In a final blow, Kratz goes on to state that the focus group operates on “two
assumptions:” first, that individuals are more willing to speak if they recognize shared experiences with
their peers, and second, that individuals will talk more readily with “strangers.” These assumptions by
themselves are not necessarily untrue or problematic, but what is problematic is the premise that the focus
group can operate on just two generalizable “assumptions,”when in reality there are many more (8). Kratz
chooses two assumptions about how people speak and how they convey information, while excluding all
the other important elements that make the focus group possible. We focus on Kratz’s statement not
because it is particularly problematic itself, but instead because it emphasizes the point that generalizing
the focus group and how it works is itself inherently problematic. While there are many other examples,
more of which could be engaged through Kratz’s article that could serve to illustrate this point, we
quickly see the problem of generalizing the success of the focus group as a productive site of knowledge
to just a few elements—the opposite of a holistic engagement with the focus group as a complex social
site—, which is exactly why each context of the focus group must be analyzed in its own right, and why it
is of the utmost importance for our project that we establish a firm break from how focus groups are
“thought” to work, and engage and analyze the unique way we ourselves conduct focus groups.
Any project we conduct first and foremost revolves around the focus group. This means that the
project begins and ends with the focus group. It begins by establishing certain “markets” or locations
where focus groups will be conducted, sometimes for the purpose of stratifying different generalizable
cultural values and social characteristics associated with any location (for example, a consumer in Atlanta
will, in general, yield a different outlook and set of values than, say, Seattle), and sometimes because a
particular brand is doing well in one “market” and not well in another. After determining markets, which
is implicitly related to determining the kind of individuals that we want for a focus group, as well as the
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relative strength or weakness of the brands in a given location, it is explicitly discussed in the terms of
what different stratifications we want to employ, ranging from ethnicity, income, gender, and other
psychographics, while also selecting specific groups of consumers based on their level of “brand
engagement.” For example, if a brand was doing poorly we wouldn’t simply want to speak with
individuals who are brand “rejecters,” but rather we would attempt to get a survey of individuals who
were “acceptors,” “switchers” or highly “loyal” to a specific brand. The former stratification of ethnicity,
income, and gender often relates to who is the “target consumer,” and, again, groups would be
constructed to survey these different levels of consumer; for example, if a brand is targeted at go-getter
millennials, yet the data tells us that there is also a significant consumer base outside of this target, we
would, of course, want to speak to and understand this consumer also. So, after the markets are selected,
and targets identified and clearly articulated, the project begins by constructing a “screener,” which is a
sort of questionnaire that will filter potential participants and allow us to construct the specific stratified
groups we have determined we would need to engage. After this screener is finalized, the actual work of
collecting and organizing individuals is relegated to market research service companies (such as the aptly
named company, Fieldwork) who take over the focus group side of the project. While our company is
working on background research and constructing a “vision” for how to approach the particular problem
or question that our employer—the company—has brought us on board to address, the market service
companies conduct their work.
To paint a general picture, when the project officially begins we simply show up at the location
where we are greeted with the liaison who has been in charge of the selection, construction and
management of groups, and taken to our room where representatives of the employing company will often
join us. In the U.S., the typical focus group facility has a relatively uniform design. It is usually a large
office or floor, centrally located in a city. Clients enter through a specified and different door and
approach the front desk in a large waiting room where there are often participants of other focus groups
waiting. Most often they are preoccupied with their phones as a default, just as they would be in any other
situation where they might find themselves in a waiting room filled with strangers. In a focus group
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facility, there are usually multiple rooms of varying sizes, often denoted with names such as the “yellow
room” or sometimes just with numbers. It is certainly possible to get lost in these maze-like offices and
accidentally stumble into the wrong room and be greeted by the confused gaze of a small cluster of people
in suits, so I always make a point to memorize the name of our room. The viewing room itself is a fairly
uniform thing — a soundproof multi-tiered set of desks where the client and marketing team can observe
the focus groups, unnoticed, via a wall of one-way glass looking into a conference room where the focus
groups are conducted.
In my experience, what really distinguishes one research facility from another is the quality of
the snacks they provide; after listening to 8 hours of back-to-back focus groups it’s nice to actually eat a
full-sized bag of M&Ms and not just the small “fun-size” bags, an experience reminiscent of youthful
memories of Halloween. I certainly remember which facilities are less “generous” with their provisions.
The actual experience of the focus group is another fairly universalizable one: you greet the employee
representatives—sometimes you know them well and sometimes you’re just meeting for the first time.
Pleasantries and small talk about travel often next ensue, “Oh how was your flight?” “Where are you
staying tonight?,” which eventually leads into a discussion of the current project, past projects, the goings
on at “Corporate” (more often than not we have a long-standing history with a particular client); however,
after these initial pleasantries, things are generally informal and “hands off.”
The focus group, especially in its early iterations, is generally a messy and unwieldy affair. Most
often they are two-hour sessions and usually 3-4 of these are conducted in a single day. I don’t blame
clients for their detachment or boredom that I even sometimes share. In fact, there is an unspoken rule: I
sit in the very front of the backroom right behind the glass, allowing clients to sit behind and above me. I
assume that this enables the client to be more comfortable doing whatever they want to do without fear of
any judgment. As the focus group begins and the participants shuffle in and find their seats, in the back
room the clients observing the groups open their laptops and, depending on hierarchy, some will openly
write emails or even check Facebook, while others will do the same serendipitously, and still others will
feign attentive listening and watching. While there are certainly clients who seem to be “just along for the
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ride,” at the other side of the spectrum many clients are deeply engaged, a result of their company’s
embodying the mantra that understanding and learning to respond to the customer is essential to success.
And since most brand marketers work in teams and often stay with a single brand for an extended period,
they accumulate a considerable and often quite nuanced understanding around the brands in their “care.”
Still, engaged or no, the clients are essentially paying us for the final “report,” which is the distillation of
our interpretations of everything that is said and not said across every focus group – our “deliverable.”
The final written report is then precisely tailored and positioned to speak to the specific questions or
needs of the client’s project; the resulting “learnings” and recommendations must be made actionable for
a massive corporate marketing team.
This paints a general picture of the whole affair from one side of the glass. The scale of focus
groups as an endeavor is now a multi-million dollar industry with millions and millions of dollars being
poured into this kind of “qualitative research” in the U.S. and abroad. If anything, most brand managers
spend more time observing focus groups than almost anything else. With the explosion of the focus group
phenomena, it makes sense that there is a sort of “universal” way the focus group seems to work as a
practice. Of course there are always exceptions: the occasional client who is extremely involved to the
point of appearing controlling, or the client who asks for us to include a question or “go after” a theme or
topic for some reason or other—and of course, we entertain these requests even when they are obviously
off-base. Externally, the focus group facilities in São Paulo, Bogotá, and Lima are quite different from
those in the U.S., and not just because they don’t usually have M&M’s. In terms of how the focus groups
play out on the inside, it’s none too different from the U.S. other than the fact that the small talk is a little
bit more difficult for me—my Spanish needs work. On the whole, the focus group as a happening is a
surprisingly predictable thing, not unlike any other part of the inner workings of the “business world.”
The real substance of the focus group and the knowledge it produces in any project occurs not in the back
room, or in the interface between our company and our employer, but on the other side of the glass, the
focus group, where the actual substance of brand knowledge is created and interpreted—a place we will
return to in order to ground our analysis of brand.
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Chapter 3-Analyzing and Engaging the Literature of Brand
Having positioned the methodological dimensions of our project and our analysis thereof, we find
ourselves tellingly in a position where the operation of brand appears most clearly when it is constructed
in a relational way to its consumer. Reframing our projects’s central argument, we need to begin again at
a foundational level when we engage brand; we need to focus on the particular mechanisms through
which brand engages, and is engaged by, the consumer, in order to locate and reconstruct a framework for
understanding and engaging brand. Going forward to further this inquiry, the natural way to proceed
seems to be to examine the discourses and literature that have engaged with brand and the themes that
surround it.
To linger for just another moment in the world of business, returning to our roots, at face value
there is a relatively simple answer to our earlier question “What is brand?” — a definition that can be
found reiterated in any business or marketing book. This definition states that, on the most basic level, the
brand helps distinguish one product from another. However, while this may be one of the things that
brand does, this isn’t what the brand is, but rather a rote description of one of the things brand can do.
Similarly, even taken to the higher level of brand identity, we are only given brand in its verb form.
Kotler’s prolific textbook Principles of Marketing, states that the brand’s identity delivers four levels of
meaning: attributes — essentially, qualities the corporation wishes to be associated with; benefits —
which serve to communicate these attributes on an emotional and experiential level; values — a central
“core” character of a brand that serves as a beacon for individuals who may share the same value; and
personality — where the brand identity can be described as if it were a person (Kotler et al: 2009). In
short, collectively, these four elements of brand identification can deliver a powerful cultural and strategic
message—again, no surprise there. Here, even on the more technical level, there is an overwhelming
preoccupation with what brand is and what it does, but without any interest or explanation as to how or
why brand works. Despite the fact that the vast majority of academic discourse related to the brand takes
place in business-centric books, journals, and debates, it seems unlikely that we will find anything of
particular value for our project in this business discourse.

58
Turning then to anthropological and other social-science texts that engage the themes relating to
brand, we must begin by overviewing the current discourse before identifying what frameworks of
thought, or elements of these frameworks, might further our project. The sub-field of economic
anthropology—especially as it intermingles with the anthropology of development—is the
anthropological discourse that, in my limited reading experience, most directly addresses the themes of
consumption and the commodity in an increasingly globalized marketplace. In part a response to the
increasing number of trained anthropologists entering the corporate world, a relatively recent
development in this field has been to turn towards the corporation as an ethnographic site or, more
generally in my experience, as something economic anthropologists, especially, should be concerned
with. Aihwa Ong’s 1987 book Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in
Malaysia, is often attributed for inspiring fellow anthropologists to turn towards a focus on the corporate.
The themes of her work center around power, labor, and gender against the backdrop of a resistance to the
ideology of capitalism. However, this turn towards the corporate that constitutes economic anthropology
is less of an analysis of the actual ways the corporate, as an object of analysis, constitutes a study in its
own right, but rather a focus on how the corporate functions as a site that structures labor. In many
economic anthropology articles and ethnographies, corporate is conflated with the factory or another site
of the creation or distribution of product. The true nature and analysis of the actual operation of the
corporate is rarely interrogated; rather, the corporation itself becomes an all-encompassing thing—which
is not only an abstraction that conceals the true nature of how the corporate operates, failing to offer any
substantive analysis of the corporate.
Often ethnographers will identify a corporate presence or element without further interrogation.
They see that a Pepsi-badged truck is unloading cans of Pepsi into a village and to them, this is the
corporation. In reality, and this is particularly true in the developing world, Pepsi owns neither that truck,
nor even those cans of Pepsi, and they certainly have nothing to do with this particular individual’s
actions of unloading these cans of Pepsi. This relates to a central problem — the conflation of brand and
advertising—that I would argue is a blatant misunderstanding and a problem that is prevalent not just in
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brand-centric anthropology, but in many other fields within anthropology—with a nod to economic
anthropology. The brand seeks to project its message via advertising, but advertising does not simply lead
back to the brand, nor does it constitute its substance. This harkens back to Ong, and how her piece,
which is centered around a factory, is regarded as the “beginning” of a corporate-centric anthropology,
while in reality the corporation is likely neither owned, nor directly had anything to do with this factory or
any of their factories. The same is true today. Nike doesn’t own any of the factories that produce their
products or have anything to do with this production-side of their business; they simply provide some
other company with a design and a quota. Thus, the conflation of factory and corporate is inherently
problematic. The only thing that connects Pepsi as a corporation to an individual unloading cans of Pepsi
is the distinct Pepsi logo—the brand.
It is unequivocally not my intention to negate the value of economic anthropology’s articles and
fieldwork. Economic anthropology and its articles and ethnographers undoubtably produce one of the
most valuable discourses related to the spirit of our project, in that it is directly concerned with
consumption and the commodity. And, while I believe that it erroneously leaves out a consideration of the
role of brand in analyzing consumption, it nonetheless moves us closer to understanding the relationship
between culture and commodity. As brand, in all its forms, becomes an ever-increasing and more
influential fixture of everyday life, and as globalization increasingly and overtly moves brand into the
developing communities that economic anthropologists typically study, it is my belief that brand will
inevitably force itself into the discourse of economic anthropology.
While the discourse of economic anthropology, which seemed like the place we would mostlikely find an approach that engaged brand, has left us disappointed, there is one exception. While
Mazzerella is not an economic anthropologist, he is a political anthropologist who focuses on
globalization and mass-media, and his writing in his 2003 ethnography Shoveling Smoke: Advertising and
Globalization in Contemporary India, is deeply grounded in the economic. While framed as a
“globalization study,” Mazzerella’s project is based on an examination of the cultural politics of mass
consumerism in the globalized marketplace, through an examination and analysis of advertising in India.
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As Mazzerella writes in the close of his introduction, “This is a book about the people who make
advertising. I theorize the practice of advertising as a kind of public cultural production, centered on a
distinctive form of commodity production, the production of commodity images” (4).
Ultimately, Mazzerella’s text is the singular ethnography that directly engages with brand, and
although the subject of brand itself is not the major component of his project, he dedicates 60ignificant
time to engage and analyze brand, and even to further a conceptual notion of brand. In his thesis in
Chapter 6, Mazzerella touches on the way that commodities attempt to attach intimacy and “concretion”
to the exchange relationship, closing his paragraph, “What I am arguing is that branding is the way that
manufacturers, and the advertising agencies that serve them, attempt to appropriate or preempt this
intimacy so as to realize higher levels of profit” (186). Reading this work, from the language, it seems
almost as though Mazzerella isn’t particularly well-versed in the brand discourse of the consumer/brand
binary. His language seems hesitant at times, making a larger claim before retreating to the undeniably
weak statement of his thesis, which is essentially the recapitulation of a blatant truism. However, this
initial thesis does little justice to the eloquent and provocative claims Mazzerella later makes. Mazzerella
re-appropriates the language of “source identity” as an intimate personality with a look and feel, as well
as a “voice” of brand. Critically, Mazzeralla writes, “…the desired demonstration of the efficacy of the
articulated brand was the consumer’s sense of being singled out—or, in Althusserian terms,
“interpellated” (203). Corroborating this with a key ethnographic example, he writes, “Now that the
physical product has happened,” the agency manager told his client, “the aim is to create in the consumer
a sense of ‘it talks to me!’” (ibid 218).
Just from these small samples, I am confidant that Mazzeralla would have found himself in a
metaphorical goldmine for deeply understanding and analyzing brand. The tragedy of Mazzerella’s text
for our project is that, although there are incredible moments of insight and clairvoyance relating to brand,
unlike us, Mazzerella is not really writing about, or focusing on, brand. Rather, for him, brand is just a
small piece to help us better understand his greater project of engaging the cultural politics of mass
consumerism in a globalized marketplace. From here, Mazzerella reverts to recapitulating classic
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articulations of brand personality, based primarily off of David Aker’s work; in short, much of
Mazzerella’s writing on brand appears as a kind of review of the things other prominent thinkers have
written, with little of his own interpretation (189). Ultimately, when Mazzerella departs from this kind of
review to construct his own interpretation of the brand relationship, while admitting an important
relationality, he reverts to a conception where the corporate and its brand and advertising are the
dominating actor over the consumer. As he writes on the commodity and its brand, “Yet, at the same time,
it is crucial that these “spaces”[brands] do not appear to be artificially imposed by corporate interests;
rather, their content and meaning—while necessarily remaining the product and property of the
corporation—should appear simply as a means by which consumers’ existing identities and aspirations
may be expressed and enacted” (ibid. 191). Thus, while we follow Mazzeralla, and even applaud him for
being the first anthropologist we have read who sees the brand and the consumer in relational terms in an
ethnographic context, it becomes increasingly clear that Mazzeralla’s conception of this relationship is
limited to the “appearance” of agency, rather than any actual “authentic” relational agency between brand
and consumer. Despite the fact that he attests that it is in the companies’ interest that the consumers feel
they are expressing themselves through brand, he is still only indirectly addressing the question of agency
by noting that companies believe consumer “self expression” is important; he is only approaching this
through a secondary source, again content to accept the second-hand beliefs and sentiments of the
marketers. This becomes increasingly overt as the chapter draws to a close, with Mazzeralla writing,
“Branding attempts to impose onto the impersonality of commodity exchange and the appearance of
unique emotionally textured relationships. At the same time, while ceaselessly referring to the interests of
the consumer, it nevertheless in the final instance depends upon asserting total corporate authority over
this process” (195). While Mazzeralla is insightful in his recognition of how brand operates on a basic
level, and how to leverage this with a focus on the intimate relationality, he, ironically, ultimately strips
the consumer of their agency not only through his disinterest in the subjectivity of the consumer
experience, but, as he makes clear above in an almost authoritarian tone, “it nevertheless in the final
instance depends upon asserting total corporate authority over this process” (ibid. 195) Although it
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initially appears as though Mazzeralla is constructing a notion of brand as a thing that is mediated by the
consumer and brand, he takes an almost authoritarian tone when he demands that the “final instance”
depends on the assertion of total corporate authority and control over this process.
The case of Mazzeralla’s engagement with brand is even more curious because, at times, he
seems to contradict himself, again appearing hesitant and unsure. In one of his most insightful moments,
he writes, “Of course it goes without saying that, in the rounds of everyday life, consumers—individually
and collectively—construct all kinds of intimate and idiosyncratic relationships with the products they
consume (ibid 186). Reading this, my heart leapt momentarily, realizing that Mazzeralla was articulating
one of the core arguments of my project — that brands are misunderstood, re-articulated, and
repurposed—yet he never mentions this character of brand or actually approaches and engages the
consumer in their everyday life. However, with this insight, Mazzeralla seems to directly contradict his
later assertion that branding depends on the assertion of complete authority over the relationship inherent
in branding; after all, how can the corporate have complete authority while also recognizing that their
consumers constantly construct their own unique relationships with brands they consume. This tension
reaches a climax in Mazzeralla’s conclusion, where he writes, “…consumerism is offered as a unique
means of self-transformation, even liberation….from the world that is,” ending the chapter with, “The gift
of the now (would be) global brand promises to affirm the cultural particularity of consumers while at the
same time liberating them from mere particularity, in short, to solve the key problem of modern public
life: the tension between embodiment and universality” (210). Here, Mazzeralla is making the leap from
the individual particularity of consumption, which he cites as a “unique means of self-transformation,
even liberation,” to the larger cultural particularity in the context of globalization. Here the “gift” of the
global brand promises to retain the cultural particularity of the consumer, while also liberating them and
allowing them to enter the newly-globalized world; this is explicit when he refers to the tension between
embodiment and universality. This utopian notion of brand as self-transformation and liberation extends
not only to the individual, but, in one fell swoop, Mazzeralla posits that it extends also to the “culture,”
that the “global” brand promises to affirm cultural particularity while also liberating consumers from
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mere particularity. While Mazzeralla seems to have done his research, as he does, at length, cite the
eminent marketer David Aaker, he has seemingly not reconciled his utopian project with the basic
marketing concept that, as your consumer market grows, your marketing strategy must grow with it and
appeal to an ever larger, and inherently “different,” consumer. The proposition of a “global brand,” which
has existed for decades in marketing discourse, has always centered around cultural “universals” rather
than the “particularity” that Mazzeralla is theorizing. Mazzarella, as the sole anthropologist to tackle the
brand ethnographically, deserves great credit in coming the closest to painting a dimensionalized portrait
of the consumer/brand relationship. However, what ultimately fails in Mazzarella’s engagement with
brand is not just his idealistic utopian vision — which we see to have fundamental flaws — but, on a
deeper level, while his project is centered around the corporate, he fails to directly engage the role of the
individual consumer, even while admitting its significance. And lastly, the moment he writes “Branding
attempts to impose onto the impersonality of commodity exchange and the appearance of unique
emotionally textured relationships. At the same time, while ceaselessly referring to the interests of the
consumer, it nevertheless in the final instance depends upon asserting total corporate authority over this
process” (ibid 195). It becomes abundantly clear that the agency and significance of the consumer
“enacting their true selves” through brand isn’t any legitimate agency, but rather the appearance of
agency, which Mazzarella seems to affirm when he writes that brands depend on the “appearance of
emotionally textured relationships,” while the actual power of the brand comes from the assertion of
“complete corporate authority” (195).
Turning now to the non-ethnographic anthropological discourse of brand, there is plenty of
theoretical material to work through. While the discourse is dominated by published articles, there are
individual anthropologists who focus specifically on consumption and the world of “things.” It is
important to take a moment to note that, as I write this, there is not a single anthropologist who could be
identified as deeply interested or engaged in the study of the brand— I hope the reader finds this as
astonishing as I did. In all of anthropology’s obsession with the commodity and exchange, from
Malinowski on, anthropology has still seemingly failed to grasp onto the modern fundamental nature of
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the commodity—the brand. There are notable anthropological publications with titles such as Material
Culture and Mass Consumption, Stuff, and Culture & Consumption, but surprisingly these titles don’t
touch on the topic of brand.
It can only be described as shocking that Daniel Miller’s 1987 Material Culture as Mass
Consumption, as well as his 2010 title Stuff, contains no mention of the word brand — just as Grant
McCraken’s 1988 Culture & Consumption, contains only one passing mention of the word. It seems
nearly impossible for any book that contains a coupling of the words “material,” “culture,” and
“consumption” to avoid talking about brand, yet there it is. McCracken’s back page reads, “This book is
about the origins and imperatives of consumer society. It shows how consumer goods and consumer
behavior are shaped by culture and probes the cultural systems of advertising, fashion, collection,
lifestyle, and self-definition.” Clearly (and accurately) this book frames itself as an investigation of
consumer society, even invoking the “system of advertising,” yet there is no substantive presence of
brand despite the fact that consumerism and brand operate almost as synonyms. It is even more surprising
that it is even possible to talk about the “systems of advertising,” while only mentioning the word brand
once. Both Miller and McCracken approach their subject matter from a materialist perspective and their
books are admittedly interesting and informative towards this project; however, it is abundantly clear that
they are dead-set on remaining within the realm of traditional anthropological materialism. This is made
clear by their avoidance of using the language, “commodity,” and, instead, using the more sanitized
vocabulary, of “thing” or “object,” despite the fact that the things they are talking about are overtly for
“consumption”—as each title denotes. Our project is not alone in arguing that the “thing-ness” of an
object and its cultural meaning and identity is inseparable from the brand. Ultimately, it’s difficult to
grasp how one could talk about modern consumerism without discussing the role of brand. However, our
project is not to critique for the sake of critique, but in this instance to shed light on an important fact: the
two most published and well-known anthropologists who write about material, culture, and consumption
do so without ever discussing brand.
Turning now to anthropological articles concerning brand theory—of which there are a
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respectable amount — we begin with the only review article available on the subject of brand. Paul
Manning’s 2010 review article The Semiotics of Brand, brings us back to one of our major themes—
instability. He begins,
Any discussion of the semiotics of brand confronts the basic problem that there is virtually no
agreement on what brand is or means. Brand stands at the intersection of the interested discourses
of brand owners, producers, consumers, as well as a diverse group of professions, each of whom
have a stake both in the definition of brand as well as in promoting the concept as a whole. In
addition, brand is often deployed as an unexamined transparent proxy for the real object of
analytical interest that lies elsewhere (Manning, 34).
We see that brand not only lacks any agreement on definition or mechanism, but also that it rests in a
highly contested space where definition and the promotion thereof seems to treat brand, ironically, as a
kind of intellectual commodity. Lastly, because brand has become so synonymous with global capitalism
that it is often deployed to serve as a symbolic or rhetorical device, a departure from the conventional
domain of economic objects. All this instability and tension, we must remember, is contained within the
specific semiotic treatment of brand. Manning identifies three recent ethnographic “tendencies” in
approaching the brand, “…which can be roughly characterized as consumption-centered, productioncentered, and product-centered” (34). Of these three, the consumption-centered approach is most
dominant, which followed “…the mid-1900s turn to privileging the consumer agency and resistance (34).
However, Manning only briefly describes the consumption-centered approach, quoted above as the most
dominant approach, but instead devotes a whole paragraph to the production-centered methodology,
which, “…while not ignoring the consumer, show the production of brand and definitions of brand to be a
privileged site for the production of professional self-definition within a “system of professions.” In
short, this methodology focuses on the brand through analyzing how brand is “produced” through its
internal production within the corporate context; here, Manning cites Mazzeralla as one practitioner of
this methodology (34).
Moving on, Manning details what he call the “dematerialization” of the brand, writing, “Because
of the metaphysical extensiveness of brand discourse and its tendency toward dematerialization, it
becomes difficult to decide where brand lives as a semiotic phenomena…” (36). Manning astutely argues
that this is in large part due to the fact that brand is “negatively defined,” writing “…..the definition of
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brand develops over time via negative, defining itself not so much by saying what brand is as what it is
not: the product” (36). Manning writes that the opposition of brand/product mirrors folk-ontological
oppositions such as immaterial/material, form/function, decorative/functional (36). As the brand moves
away from being a “symbolic extension” of the product, “the intangible sum of a product’s attributes, its
name, packaging, and price, its history, reputation…,” to a “dull, passive, inert utility…”—which is
described as a “leaving behind”— the now denatured product takes on, what Manning calls, new
“spiritual dimensions” (Manning, 36). While this portraiture is vivid, it suffers from its own self-imposed
limitations. Firstly, the brand is not always conceived as an extension of the product; instead, products are
often constructed for brands, and secondly, brand/product binary conceived of as a negative is
problematized here when we recognize that what has happened is a collapse of the binary; the brand has
become the product. The brand is negatively defined because of its immateriality, yet at the same time the
product can only be defined via brand, since without brand it lacks any articulated meaning as a
commodity. Manning writes, “The realization of the brand depends on the materiality of the product
(producing Latourian hybrids), but the brand and the product must be kept separate (purification).” Here,
Manning seems to be presenting a paradox: Latour’s notion of the “hybrid,” as a connection of the social
and natural, is a direct product of his aversion to duality (40). However, Manning appears to be arguing
that the realization of brand depends on the duality, insofar as the materiality of the product and the brand
of the product must be kept separate — a direct clash with Latour. Even if Manning is employing a
complex semiotic analysis that goes over my head, on a fundamental level, by invoking Latour, Manning
appears to endanger his insistence on the separation of brand and product.
Manning’s semiotic analysis is lengthy and complex, and ultimately he is analyzing the brand
from a very different vantage point than our project necessitates. At the close of his article, he is not only
analyzing the brand as a semiotic phenomena but also complicating this by extending the traditional
notion of the consumer of the brand to a wider range of consumers — not just those who are buying the
brand and its product, but also the corporate client who is “buying into” brand (46). While much of
Manning’s piece falls outside the purview of our project, he does exemplify a number of pervasive beliefs
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about the relationship between brand and product. Firstly, by problematizing the dematerialization of
brand, he reveals an aversion to hybrid brand/product, and later overtly positions the “realization” of the
brand as dependent on this separation. Despite the fact that this is positioned as a review piece, although
Manning seems to speak for himself quite clearly, it may seem trite to criticize it for lacking any situated
engagement with the consumer. However, I am willing to bring this criticism specifically because he cites
the “consumer-centric” approach as the most dominant semiotic approach, while any discussion of the
consumer is largely ignored within this piece. Ultimately, attempts at analyzing brand without grounding
it in a situated moment, where brand interfaces with a consumer, can only take you so far. When writing
about brand, it is easy to get lost in theoretical technicalities and other abstractions; thankfully, the jarring
subjectivity of reality serves as the only antidote—a point which Manning seems to be approaching at the
close of his piece. On a most basic level, were Manning to enter a supermarket and ask a customer, “that
soda you are buying, what is it? Brand or product?” he might more readily see that the materiality of the
product and its brand are not so easily separated, and, furthermore, that these sorts of theoretical questions
struggle, when abstracted beyond the immediate context of the brand and consumer relationship. That
being said, Manning does help to illustrate that the technical relationship between product and brand
cannot be ignored as a foundational starting place; he deserves significant credit in that his piece goes into
the technical dimensions of brand/product that are otherwise ignored.
One of the more illuminating anthropological articles on brand is Nakassis’s 2013 Brands and
Their Surfeits, which analytically approaches the brand through the “counterfeit” and other unauthorized
brand forms. A central recurring theme in Nakassis’s piece is the instability of brands, as he writes in his
abstract, “…the novel and often unpredictable social meaning that emerges through moments of brand
consumption, on the other hand, I argue that at the heart of the brand is an instability, a tendency towards
an excess of meaning and material” (1). For Nakassis, these instances of instability where the brand is
reconfigured and re-negotiated in moments of tension, constituted by the “fake” inauthentic brand — as
he writes, “moments when the brand displaces itself” — these are the moments where brand comes into
focus as a relational and socially-negotiated thing (2). While Nakassi focuses primarily on brand as it is

68
troubled by its material surfeit—the counterfeit—, in a broader sense he is one of the few anthropologists
who clearly addresses the instability and dynamism of the consumer/brand relationship, writing, “On the
other hand, the brand is troubled by the surfeit of social meaning that is constantly produced by
idiosyncratic and contextualized experiences of consumer engagement with brand forms (authorized or
otherwise)” (3). Nakassi explicitly writes, “The brand is never able to legislate its own intelligibility
completely,” going on to enumerate, “there are simply no guarantees that the brand will be seen by
various consumer publics as it projects itself, or even as a brand or “counterfeit at all” (8). Going even
deeper, Nakassi argues that brand viability depends on consumers generating meaning through brand
engagement that goes beyond existing “brand image or identity;” this material surfeit of image
“…consumers’ local meanings, idiosyncratic associations, and emotional investments” are the source of
the brand’s “vitality” (9). As he articulates, “The brand’s fragility and openness to novel (re)signification
creates surplus value because it makes the brand a possible site, and medium, for socially and affective
attachment” (ibid. 9). Here, Nakassi is making an essential point about the instability inherent in the
socially-constructed brand. While Nakassi’s article trends towards complicating the inherently sociallyconstructed and unstable nature of the brand with language such as “surplus value,” he nevertheless
provides one of the clearest anthropological accounts of brand as a fragile and unstable thing, precisely
because brand exists relationally between consumers and “brand producers.” As he makes explicit, “This
is not simply a theoretical point. It is an empirical observation, one that escapes marketing theory and
other brand discourses that assume the pre-given intelligibility, coherence, and stability of the brand,”
going on to state that it is only in moments where the brand is displaced and treated as an unstable
element that we can begin to engage with brand (ibid. 10).
While Nakassi makes the point of the instability of brand, locating it in large part in the relational
social articulation and re-articulation inherent in the brand consumer relationship, he is less clear on what
kind of “agency” this process confers on the consumer. Although Nakassi is engaging the consumer in
important ways, he is still doing it from a distance. His perspectival vantage point seems to revolve
around the corporate element of brand. He seems even to echo Mazzeralla in his conclusion, when he
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writes that “Brand logic requires the brand to constantly slip outside of itself, to traffic in risk and threat
(and thus speculative possibility), a promiscuity that must be closely monitored by legal and marketing
practice.” Thus, while he acknowledges the nature of brand as a socially-constructed and mediated thing
via the consumer, and privileges this as a site for the analysis of the brand, he nonetheless seems to locate
the essence of brand as belonging in the domain of the corporate (ibid.13). In short, he recognizes that
brand is reshaped and reimagined by consumers, but he isn’t interested in what this means for the
consumer, but rather what this means for the brand, which ultimately reveals itself to be essentially
conflated with the corporate. Despite Nakassi being one of the more enlightening and valuable authors in
our project, he is nevertheless approaching brand from a distinctly—to return to Manning— “production
centered” logic. Nakassi acknowledges the same relational constructed nature of consumer/brand, but,
while his treatment of the brand is developed at length, his attention to the role played by the consumer in
the consumer/brand binary is comparatively nascent, despite the fact that he explicitly admits that it is the
consumer who is singularly responsible for “brand viability.” Our critique of Nakassi is not to
problematize his “production-centered” approach, nor his privileging the corporate brand side over the
“consumer side,” but simply to criticize his lack of reflexivity, so as to highlight another common theme.
No anthropologists writing on brand seem to feel the need to justify or explain the logic behind their
asymmetrical privileging of brand over consumer. In this case, the consumer is positioned as the sole
agent responsible for “brand vitality,” while they are simultaneously placed as a kind of oppositional
counter-point against which the corporate element can be analyzed. It seems that such blatant
asymmetries should require some kind of explanation, especially from a piece such as Nakassi’s which
predicates itself on the instability of the consumer/brand relationship. Ultimately, it is all too common to
see the role of the consumer glossed over—without any explanation—as an essential, yet faceless, actor
in corporate construction of brand; such a tendency could seemingly only develop through the discursive
naturalization of the consumer as an abstract agentic object, something to be related to, not with.
In a second 2012 article titled Brand, Citationality, and Performativity, Nakassi discusses the
semiotic structure of brand as an alignment between brand “tokens,” “types,” and “ontologies;” however,
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where his article differs—even if just slightly—from other semiotic treatments of brand, is that in his
conclusion when he calls for us to turn our attention to moments where the brand is “denatured”—again
we must note the prevalent theme of instability—he writes, “Such an approach requests us to be
committed, on one hand to the empirical (and I would suggest ethnographic) of the actual social lives of
brands in their historical and cultural contexts…” (636). In short, even while approaching brand from an
exclusively semiotic perspective, he suggests that an “empirical” situated study of the “actual social lives”
of brands is also necessary. This phenomena of “stopping short” of engaging the actual situated reality of
brand and consumer while simultaneously acknowledging its importance, is a pervasive trend that graces
the conclusions of many other anthropological and sociological texts I’ve read. The importance of this
intimate situated knowledge of brand is taciturnly acknowledged, but never engaged. In my eyes, this
points to the conscious or unconscious knowledge that such an admission must necessarily accompany
any anthropologist working within the prevailing notion of brand, as relationally-defined and produced
from the consumer/brand relationship. Even if writers want to avoid directly engaging the binary to focus
on some other angle—such as semiotics—the admission itself helps fortify the piece and absolve the
writer of any analytical oversight on the subject of brand.
Turning now to a hybrid economic and culture-oriented anthropological approach to brand in
David Foster’s 2007 article The Work of the New Economy: Consumers, Brands, and Value Creation:
Foster promisingly states in his abstract, “My goal in this article is to apprehend claims about personproduct relationships now circulating in the world of business. I take up approaches that presuppose the
embeddedness of economic action in shifting networks or assemblages of people and things, and that call
attention to the agency distributed within such networks.” However, he falls short precisely because he
ultimately appears unable to access this “person-product” relationship in anything other than its most
abstract form as an “assemblage” (Foster, 727-8). Foster’s project attempts to center his proposition of
consumer agency and “value creation” around a 1997 case study of a Coca-Cola sponsored photography
competition—an overt attempt at marketing— by drawing upon secondary sources or “accounts” of two
other anthropologists (ibid 728). Foster continues to engage his question via this case study through an
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analysis of these two anthropologists, yet comes short of substantive analysis as his conclusion indicates,
“…consumer agency is a source of disruption, of unruly overflowings that escape capture and even
destroy value—notably, the value of brands…This disruption stems from consumer agency’s capacity to
assemble publics around matters of concern.” Returning to his case study, “When these matters of
concern originate in the business operations of corporations…such as Coca-Cola soft drinks, the
proliferation of concerned individuals and groups assembled as a public can seem almost endless” (ibid.
727). Certainly, Foster seems to have presented an answer to his general question of the agency of publics
or assemblages; however, we see that the “person” within the analysis of the “person-product”
relationship is only ever addressed as an “assemblage,” and not as an actual “person” in the sense of the
singular individual. Here, Foster stops short of addressing the nature of agency in the “person-product”
relationship because he only addresses the “person” in the context of a “public” or an “assemblage” and
not in their agency as actual individuals. This piece exemplifies the seeming inability of anthropological
writings on brand to resist any approach to the consumer that does not involve casting them into sweeping
groups or “assemblages,” while, simultaneously, allowing the juxtaposing brand to retain its individuality
and agency as an analytical object.
***
In retrospect, our review has sought to pick out texts that are both representative of some element
of the discourse, while also choosing to engage the most salient and promising anthropological work
relating to brand for our project—writing that comes closest to the particularity of the consumer/brand
relationship, for the sake of presenting the most productive engagement possible. Our review has
attempted to populate the discursive landscape our project inhabits. Beyond the basic necessity of
situating oneself in a discourse, our critical engagement with the anthropological literature of brand has
revealed the crucial points of productive tension. Before turning towards a more critical lens, through our
analytical review we found one clear all-important commonality between our treatment of brand and the
discourse—the theme of instability and relationality. Our philosophical treatment of brand was a journey
that began with the seeming “unspeakable” relationship between the product and the individual in ancient

72
Greek thought, into Marx, tracing the development of this tension and instability, and finally ending by
establishing an inherent instability in the relationship between individual and commodity. In short, as I
wrote in Section I, “Philosophy has not only shown us that the true nature of the commodity is found in
its social meaning—its brand—, but also the essential instability of this social meaning, this territory
within which modern brand marketing attempts to assert itself.” Just as we predicted, the earliest form of
brand creation can explicitly be seen addressing this instability inherent in the consumer/commodity
relationship, in their attempt to create branded “social meanings” to affix to commodities in order to
compete in the marketplace. Within Section I, we also presented that this instability and tension was a
result of the relational nature of the consumer and the branded commodity. Our literature review reveals a
discourse of brand that directly reflects the relational instability of brand that we identified in Section I.
Echoing the concluding chapter in Section I, “Synthesis: Philosophy to Brand,” the anthropological
discourse presents a theoretical framework of brand as a relationship between consumer and brand, with
some writers going further to engage the dynamism inherent in this relationality: its tensions, rearticulations, and transgressions. Thus, on this most fundamental level, the discourse of the anthropology
of the brand seems to further and carry forward the basic understanding of brand that we were only able
to tentatively suggest in our first section.
While it is a relief to find that the anthropology of brand seems to—on some level—reflect the
understanding of brand that we approached through our philosophical inquiry, it also appears as though
the discursive engagement with brand stops short at this basic level. Again, to return to one of the earliest
themes of the project — the “unspeakable” nature of the individual/product relationship — we see what
might appear as a potential second iteration of this same un-approachability, in which the anthropological
discourse on brand seems to lag both in quality and quantity. In the last 20 years, brand has explosively
extended from the corporate world to be a clarion call to legions of “wired in” media consumers who are
actively taking on the role of personal brand managers in creating, crafting and managing their own brand
identities moment by moment. In fact, it is difficult to identify another phenomenon such as brand, in
terms of launching such an outpouring of cultural focus, creativity, and meaning-making as the
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brand. Lifestyle brands, and many others, create whole lexicons of meaning, value and imagery that
consumers readily consume and engage with. Billions and billions of dollars are being spent, not to
mention, as well, that some of our best and brightest creative minds are all busy working in service to the
production, management and ever-evolving mythos of brand worlds—while anthropology appears only
on the sidelines.
At its core, the construction of brand as a relational binary of consumer/brand, lends itself well to
an avoidance or singular focus on just one aspect of the binary. This is seen poignantly in Mazzeralla’s
ethnography: by having already situated the consumer/brand relationship, this binary sets a precedent that
allows Mazzeralla to almost exclusively discuss the corporate brand side of the binary, while the
consumer side can be taken for granted as an established thing. Here the established binary allows
Mazzeralla to engage, analyze, and speak at great length to the brand side, all while the consumer remains
distinctly secondary. Here, it would be too much to say that the consumer/brand relationship remains
“unspeakable;” but, insofar as one would desire a symmetrical binary of consumer/brand, we see that
Mazzeralla has explicitly chosen to rely on this established theoretical binary as a kind of analytical
precedent or starting place that allows him to configure and understand the consumer without having to
do any real “new work” on the theoretical brand binary.
Perhaps the strongest indication of this “unspeakable” nature of the consumer/brand relationship,
is the simple fact that Mazzeralla’s Shoveling Smoke is the only fully-fledged ethnographic attempt to
approach brand, as every other anthropological approach is a theoretical one. While the anthropological
discourse relating to brand is comparatively small, I can find no other strand in anthropology that is as
bafflingly dominated by the theoretical treatment of a very approachable phenomena such as ours. There
is no doubt that the anthropology relating to brand falls within the bounds of cultural anthropology,
dipping into economic as well as linguistic/semiotic anthropology, yet the field seems to avoid fieldwork
and ethnography, with no obvious explanation. If anything, the discursively established understanding of
brand as a relationship between consumer and brand, seems to explicitly call for fieldwork. Here, brand is
clearly identified as being constructed out of a system of reciprocity, between two distinct agentic actors
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where the hierarchy and power are explicitly negotiated and performed—in short, the anthropology of the
brand is overflowing with the classic themes anthropology has historically engaged through ethnography.
To pull just one element, reciprocity: there is no doubt that every anthropologist who has written on brand
is quite familiar with the canonical debate—which is firmly situated in fieldwork— between Malinowski
and Mauss over the “norm of reciprocity,” where even Lévi-Strauss ultimately weighs in with the claim
that all human relationships are based on the norm of reciprocity. We must then ask ourselves why all the
anthropologists, who have written on brand as a system of reciprocity, have avoided fieldwork? And even
beyond that, why have they largely avoided even calling for a more grounded or situated approach?
Returning to a more direct critical place, what our review poignantly revealed is that the literature
of brand lacks any direct grounded engagement with the consumer/brand relationship. Even in the
singular ethnography discussed, the actual “voice” of the consumer remains unheard and
underrepresented, while we get plenty of access to the voices of marketers and “brand-producers.” Even
after putting aside our fundamental disagreements with writers who privilege the agency of the corporate
over the consumer, we still encounter a fundamental problem. Even as almost every anthropological
engagement with brand privileged the site of the consumer/brand relationship as the locus of knowledge
for analyzing the brand, there are seemingly no attempts made at actually accessing this site in any direct
way. Furthermore, throughout the discourse, the engagement with the consumer side of this relational
binary of brand is virtually nonexistent, while the agency and voice of the brand, in stark contrast, is
omnipresent—likely due to its comparative accessibility. The discourse seemingly acknowledges the
primacy of the consumer/brand relationship as the singular and richest source of knowledge, even while
anthropologist practitioners seem either uninterested, unwilling or unable to access this site of
“knowledge production” in any direct way.
As a result, the discourse as a whole appears to hover above an analysis of brand, recapitulating
and reformulating similar ideas without advancing into any distinctly or noticeably “new” analytical
territory. I would argue that this stagnation is a direct result of the fact that most anthropologists have
complacently worked with an understanding of brand as consumer/brand relationship, as if it were a kind
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of agreed-upon and defined analytical framework, without going beyond the superficial to engage with
the “actual” situated nature of the consumer/brand relationship. Taken as a whole, anthropology has
seemingly taken only the smallest step towards engaging the cultural phenomenon of brand, and stopped
dead. The particularity of an engagement with brand—which, ironically, writers often insist upon—is
thrown away in favor of the superficial, and now discursively stale, anthropological understanding of
brand. Our project is fundamentally incompatible with this impoverished analytical framing of brand, as
the consumer/brand relationship lacks any actual depth or substance. Rather, to know brand, you must
observe its actual creation and ongoing consumer-driven evolution. Only through a contextualized and
situated analysis can we even begin to approach the interconnected questions of how brand is created and
engaged. What we require is a finely-tuned analytical instrument that is designed specifically for a direct
engagement with the individual and brand—with that, we return to the focus group.
Chapter 4- Returning to Our Focus Group as a Site
Marketers, like the anthropologists we have read, know that brand exists as a brand/consumer
relationship; thus, the focus group is the preeminent tool for the marketer, because it fills the gaps of any
quantitative knowledge with deeper qualitative knowledge of the consumer. The focus group is
synonymous with a richer and deeper approach to brand, because it is seen as the most intimate site of
interface between the consumer and the brand. However, while the focus group can be generalized in the
same way brand can be generalized, our project has a unique methodological approach to the focus group.
Our methodology is one that seeks to elicit and engage intimate consumer/brand relationship — a
methodology that, when examined, is equally illustrative of how brand operates. Turning then to detail
how our focus group approaches the substance of brand, we begin by painting a rough picture. Each focus
group begins in essentially the same way: participants quietly shuffle in, find their seats, sometimes grab a
soda or take a glass of water, and turn their heads to the moderator at the head of the table. Each focus
group has a similarly rehearsed beginning that is carefully and intentionally crafted. Most participants are
here after work, although in my experience they don’t appear to show it. I would imagine that they would
rather be at home; thus, following this, it makes sense that the whole success of any particular focus group
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is dependent upon making, or allowing, participants to be engaged and interested. Speaking to the
nuances of hierarchy and authority that Kratz touches on, the moderator is purposefully dressed in casual
and neutral attire that is intended to put everyone at ease; as not every participant has the same
expectation for a focus group, some come in dressed informally, while others seem to have dressed up for
the occasion. This easily-overlooked, purposeful decision of neutral casual attire is the first instance
where the implicit authority of the moderator is intentionally toned down. The group begins in an
informal and friendly way; individuals are asked to raise their hands “if they’ve done this before,” and
jokes are made, “it can’t be too bad if these people came back for a second time.” From here, participants
are assured that the moderator isn’t looking for, or expecting, any kind of specific answers, but that they
just want to hear honest opinions. Additionally, it is emphasized that the moderator doesn’t represent any
brand or product that might be discussed, so participants shouldn’t worry about saying what they really
think. The participants, instead, are purposefully invoked as experts, stressing that, “we are here today to
hear what you have to say.” It is casually joked that everyone sitting at the table are essentially strangers,
and that, after these two hours are up, everyone will go their own way. Lastly, participants are actively
encouraged to speak their mind, to disagree with one another, and, most importantly, to have fun.
The two major points, or “notes,” that the focus group is attempting to establish from the get-go
are: firstly, the comfort of the participant, and the positioning of them as empowered voices that we
carefully selected and are actually paying to hear. Everything done in the beginning of the focus group is
designed around diffusing and democratizing authority, and the moderator is projecting an “amped-up,”
fun and casual character in order to position the group as simply a casual discussion among peers.
Individuals are asked to introduce themselves not in the “boring way,” but are, instead, encouraged to
share something about their hobbies and what they’re really interested in. In short, rather than get a sense
of who works where and how much they make and all the other sorts of “differentiation” that accompany
the standard introduction (age, job, family life, etc.), participants are encouraged to see each other as
peers, while also diffusing any potential differences or tensions. As the focus group goes on, you can
visibly see participants relax and open up. This is really the only generalizable portrait of the focus group:
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that, from the beginning, individuals are invited to let their guard down and engage in as authentic a
discussion as any group of like individuals can possibly have. And, with very few exceptions, from the
carefully-crafted seminal beginning of the focus group, until the end, the system seems to work
flawlessly. Of course, some groups work better than others, but this seems to come down to how well the
individual members of the group seem to mesh with each other, rather than the actual topic of the focus
group or anything the moderator does or asks.
Addressing this specific and intentional construction of a focus group, we can begin to analyze
and engage it as a unique site of knowledge production. First and foremost, we can see that the focus
group as a “site” is purposefully producing a “space” that exists outside of the expected, or typical,
hierarchies one might associate with the standard idea of what a focus group is: a space where honest and
authentic discussion is encouraged, and where the individual’s experiences and opinions are heard and
valued, not just among their fellows but also by the “nameless corporation” that wants to hear your voice.
The knowledge that this is still a focus group, that there is some purpose here, that the participant’s voice
is being seen, heard, and, above all, valued by the austere “Corporate,” is equally essential. The
realization that something you say may very well actively shape the next flavor of Coke, or the next
packaging innovation for Cheez-Its, or the next series on HBO, is an undeniably powerful realization. But
often, since focus groups are, for the most part, non-specific or vague before they narrow in, just having
your experiences and opinions heard is itself a powerful thing—especially among groups of individuals
who are not accustomed to this sensation. Oftentimes, people will leave smiling, asking, “Who this was
for?” or, “What was this about?” Sometimes they will even stay after the group and thank the moderator
for such a unique and unexpected intimate experience. In many ways, the focus group cuts the outside
world off; it invites and empowers a striking kind of intimate honesty. It is difficult to describe how
visibly you can see the mood or “tenor” of the room change, from a group of people who likely expected
to be asked a series of dry questions by some man in a suit, to a group who has participated in a genuine
conversation and purposefully creative exploration, where each has experienced the sensation of
empowerment and the feeling that they have somehow been “heard” by someone – as well as offered up
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worthy insights. This, of course, occurs in degrees; not every group or individual appears to experience
this transformation, although I would say it seems to occur more often than not in my experience as an
onlooker. Throughout my many observations, at the very least, a “good” group transforms a bored and
confused group of people who had no expectation whatsoever of “this” focus group experience, let alone
any expectation of “catharsis,” into a group who seemingly leaves with a sense of having experienced
something entirely unexpected and unique.
This is not just the by-product of the focus group, but an intentional result of individuals having
had an experience of being “heard” by their peers, as well as by something as abstract and austere as a
corporation. The goal of each focus group is not only to hear what each individual experiences in their
daily life, but also to get as close to evoking an individual’s authentic experience and engagement with
brand as possible. Because brand never exists in a cultural vacuum, each focus group necessarily has to
ground itself in the individual and collective experiences of its participants. Before continuing on to more
narrow and nuanced questions, there must necessarily be a context. Participants are not asked to abstract
themselves from the realities of their everyday life so as to get at some “pure” notion of how they relate to
a brand, but rather the opposite. They are asked to ground their experiences and engagement with brand in
their daily experiences, which is why the focus group begins with, and is predicated on, these larger
questions of social and cultural experience. Brand knowledge must be situated in a deeper contextualized
knowledge of its consumer. This is not a fetishization of everyday life, but rather the simple admission
that knowledge of any kind cannot be separated from its context, which is especially true of any
knowledge regarding the engagement with brand, as it is almost always deeply rooted in layers of
meaning. Thus, particular to brand work, the focus group is producing or articulating existing latent
knowledge, but it could be more accurately depicted as a process of unpacking the knowledge and insight
a consumer has surrounding a brand – much of which is unconsciously held. For brand, the focus group
as a site of knowledge is neither the abstraction of the brand from everyday life, nor an obsession with the
situated details of everyday engagement with brand; rather, it is somewhere in the middle.
Taking a step back, having established a fully-fledged description of our focus group as the
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“material” that serves as the foundation for our ethnographic project, we have seemingly returned to
center on the situated moment where an individual consumer engages with brand in a relational way. In
other words, the methodology of our focus group mirrors the same notion that brand must be engaged and
understood as a constructed relational thing that rests as the premise for our project. The methodology of
our focus group allows us to engage the nature of brand in its purest and most dynamic form, situated in
different brands with different contexts, situated in socio-cultural relationships, as well as within
individual relationships. Each project’s focus groups reveal its own unique and layered relationship,
imagery, values and associations with a brand, while at the same time contributing to the greater body of
understanding brand. Only through patching together many situated projects—which are, in turn, the sum
of the knowledge produced within the focus groups—and their commonalities and divergences, can we
hope to approach a greater, more general, analysis of how brand operates as a relational vehicle of
meaning.
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SECTION III- What is Brand?
Chapter 1- A Return: What is our Brand?
Stepping back, having surveyed the discourse around brand and engaged it with our project’s
focus group methodology, we are now at the point where we can begin to engage with brand on our own
terms. We have seen how the world of business and marketing engages brand. We have seen how the
anthropological discourse engages brand, locating and defining it as the product of a consumer/brand
relationship. However, as we identified, both these approaches suffer from a fundamental superficiality.
In the case of anthropology, which frames brand as a relational dichotomy of consumer/brand—a kind of
analytical truism itself—, we see how neglected the actual situated nature of the consumer/brand
relationship is. As a result, it appears that we have to go back to a kind of analytical drawing board if our
project is to holistically engage brand. This is why we return to the same, all-encompassing, question that
occupied the conclusion of our first section. However, we are at the point where we are creating our own
new framework for understanding and engaging brand; thus, we can modify the question to—what is our
brand?
Fortunately, we have already done some of this work; we have determined that the commodity
and the brand are distinct elements. Without the social meaning or intelligibility that brand creates, the
commodity is a lifeless thing. And, in turn, without the commodity the brand has no intelligible
substance. Thus, brand must be constructed as a union of these two distinct and identifiable units. If we
want to understand an individual product, we must also understand its brand. On a basic level, this
appears as brand product synergy, where the product delivers on the promise of its brand and,
simultaneously, the brand’s halo extends and delivers the product it has promised. The conflation of
product and brand, which Manning aptly described as a “dematerialization” of brand, is an easy, yet
dangerous, mistake—one we see many anthropologists writing on brand fall victim to. Even in a semiotic
analysis such as Manning’s, who acknowledges that brand is becoming increasingly immaterial, the
greater analytical question of “why” that follows is answered only through attributing it to the undeniably
abstract trend of “dematerialization of meaning” that Manning cites (Manning, 34). While Manning
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illustrates an important trend, he does not readily provide us with any answer. Furthermore, while
Manning directly addresses the nature of brand as a relationship between product and brand, when he
ultimately discusses the “dematerialization” of brand, he is speaking about brand in the most general
sense — brand as a phenomenon. Our project needs to narrow in on the particularity of how and why the
brand becomes dematerialized from its product.
The technical relationship between product and brand cannot be ignored as a foundational starting
place; generally speaking, brands are built around products. Furthermore, in the most general sense, the
materiality of the product itself always exists before the brand. The nature of the product structures the
brand in important ways, just as the brand helps structure the product, both for its producer and consumer.
As thinkers such as Appadurai and DeCerteau illustrate, objects cannot be separated from a socio-cultural
context; value and meaning always exist in relation to the world of objects that is constructed and reconstructed. Thus, in the most general sense, the product is already socially-situated. Putting the modern
notion of the brand aside, one could even think of this as a “meta-brand,” insofar as brand already exists
within any cultural object as its meaning. For example, the cultural and social meaning or function of
wine is distinctly different than that of hard liquor; we are poignantly aware of the normative structures
inherent in our understanding of the roles, rites, and rules of consumption, etc. Thus, any product already
exists in a socially-constructed and meaningful way; it is already “meta-branded” by our culture. To
illustrate, the idea of attempting to sell your consumer an idea of an “extreme party wine” seems a bit
ludicrous, as it goes against the normative consumption of wine as something associated with
sophistication, relaxation, and civility. This, of course, is culturally and normatively situated; however, it
is far easier to work within the structures that culture imposes on products than to attempt to subvert
them. We cannot ignore the ways that the cultural and normative landscape structures the product, if we
want to understand the technical relationship between product and brand. In short, the product dictates
what territory the brand might be able to play in. Although it may be easier and expedient to speak of
brand as an implicit hybrid combination of brand and product, this move cannot be undertaken without
first fully acknowledging the essential technical nature of the product and its relationship to brand.
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To further this, in the marketing context it is not uncommon to hear that a certain product is too
“brand heavy,” or that a certain brand is too “product heavy.” This is an asymmetry that is not uncommon
— consumers buying a product without feeling any attachment to the brand, or a consumer buying a
product simply because of its brand. Of course, it is more complex than this as there are many more
factors or motivations in play, but, on a basic level, there should be an appropriate symmetry between
brand and product in the eyes of the consumer. This is the ideal, the synthesis of brand and product where
a consumer is buying a product not only on the merits of the product’s physical attributes, but also
because the brand has successfully imbued the product with meaningful imagery and attributes—this is
not just a can of ‘cola,’ this is a Coke.
Going forward, we admit to the “dematerialization” of brand, but insist on an engagement of
brand that consciously—if implicitly— includes the product/brand relationship. In this way, the brand is
undoubtedly fully dematerialized from its product, but our treatment of brand has attempted to anticipate
and incorporate the inherent materiality of brand in our ongoing project. In our project, dematerialization
is a consciously ever-present element of the brand. Thus, when we refer to brand, we are also implicitly
invoking its materiality. Lastly, we would argue that the general dematerialization of the brand in mass
culture was always an inevitability — a dematerialization that takes on a new character in the modern
digital era, a subject that will be returned to.
Having now established the essential nature of the relationship between brand and product as a
part of our working analytical framework, we can move forward in our analysis of brand and how it
operates. To establish a working definition of brand, we begin by considering how brand works, what it
does, and why. On a most basic level, as the marketing textbooks would corroborate, brand helps
differentiate one product from another in the eyes of the consumer. In this purely utilitarian configuration,
brand exists to present a choice to the consumer in a crowded context. However, this seemingly obvious
and basic definition lays the groundwork for the construction of brand as a relationship between the
consumer and the brand, as the notion of choice is an affirmation of the consumer’s agency. The obvious
move here is to recognize that this choice is not a choice, but rather a “choose me.” In that particular
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moment where any consumer stands in a grocery store aisle staring at a multi-colored sea of cereal boxes,
each product is crying out “choose me.” And which cereal will our consumer choose? They will choose
the product who they heard. And, in turn, they will hear and pay attention to the “voice” of the brand that
seems to best understand them, reflect their identity, affirm and celebrate their values, and share their
sense of style. This is the language of the brand — the brand voice.
Of course, we must admit that branding is not the only element of marketing, just as it is not the
only element of choice. There is pricing, display, convenience, and many other elements that go into
marketing a particular choice. That being said, brand remains at the core. When marketing a choice, brand
and all its attributes—product, advertising, package design, etc.— must align; but we must also consider
the practical reality. If I go to the grocery store on a budget, I am looking for product choices that are
affordable; however, this, of course, does not mean that I am simply going to buy the cheapest version of
every product on my grocery list. Rather, before I even enter the store, I have strong ideas about which
brands are expensive and which brands are cheap. I might buy a more generic-looking item because I
believe that the generic brand is always the most affordable, without considering other options and
realizing that some other brand is actually cheaper — as I’ve heard countless times in focus groups: some
version of, “Oh I don’t even look at those, they look too expensive.” Brand recognizes that it must play its
role, it must embody a certain choice. Here, since our example revolves around packaged goods, cheaper
brands are almost always more visually muted; they lack the more colorful and flashy “branded” look of
more expensive choices—however, this appearance/price phenomena is present in almost every
commodity. In short, the visual appearance corresponds to the notion that they are an affordable choice,
and are strategically trying to appear sensible, clear and value-conscious. Here, we see one of the most
basic precepts of brand: it is aimed at fully embodying and voicing a choice, or a set of choices, ranging
from the intimate to the mundane.
While it certainly isn't the singular function of brand, at its productive core, brand seeks to project
a kind of embodied identity, a voice; we see that the project of brand creation is the construction of an
embodied entity that speaks to the consumer—a distinct echo of Marx’s fetishism. The key here, then, is
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to speak in a “voice” that is most easily heard and engaged. In a project of co-creation with the consumer,
the brand takes on human qualities and attributes as it is anthropomorphized. The brand takes on an
embodied identity that unmistakably mirrors relatable human characteristics. The brand is speaking to us
in our language; it is both reflecting, anticipating, and leading us. Brands are constructed around
identifying and addressing consumer needs, wants, and desires. Most often, the focus is centered around
the want and desire part, as these tap into a powerful emotional space which is usually a winning move.
As an aim, brands are always aspirational; they almost always promise something that you desire. Here
the “voice” of brand attempts to tap into your emotional and aspirational self—as Mazzerella engages in
his treatment of advertising. Brands always contain a coded promise, a set of images and emotions
designed to speak to something you desire — not the you you are now, but the you you want to be. This is
not to say that brands always succeed in this, but this aspirational quality is at the root of every brand. A
brand is like any identity; it desires to be the kind of person it wants to be, the kind of person it wants to
project. In Baudrillard’s early 1968 work The System of Objects, he engages and modernizes Marx’s
analysis of the commodity in a particularly enlightening way, suggesting that the qua object of
consumption is a thing not in relation to other individuals or objects, but that, “It is consumed instead as a
signifier of that relation,” continuing,
This defines consumption as a systematic and total idealist practice, which far exceeds our
relations to objects and relations among individuals, one that extends to all manifestations
(registres) of history, communication, and culture. Thus, the need for culture is alive: but in the
collector’s book or in the dining room lithograph; only the idea is consumed (27).
In Baudrillard’s interpretation, consumption no longer has to do with the satisfaction of needs or even
with the “reality principle.” For him, consumption and the object rest completely in the real of the
idealistic; as he states, “only the idea is consumed” (Baudrillard 27). What Baudrillard is suggesting is
that consumption no longer has anything to do with the object itself, but with what the idea of the
consumed object promises. Baudrillard is not only insightful, but also far ahead of his time in suggesting
that the act of consumption has become a personal idealistic practice, where it is not the just the product
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itself that is consumed, but, rather, it is the idea and the personal expectations, meanings, and values
associated with the objects that are consumed. Articulating something that would take decades to make its
way into the marketing discourse, Baudrillard identifies the inherently idealistic motivation of
consumption. Thus, when I am buying a new dining room table, I am really buying the possibility of
delicious family dinners, the promise of good conversation with friends, laughter, joy and recognition of
my idealized identity. When I am buying a new, expensive Mercedes I am not just buying a car; I am
buying the idea of sophistication, success, status. It doesn't seem a leap to suggest that Baudrillard’s
“consumed idea” is synonymous with brand, as brand is the principle purveyor of both of these “ideas”
and the commodified objects they are associated with. In fact, the very idea of the brand seems to hinge
on this individualized and idealistic model of consumption; the “voice” of brand is seeking to tap into
your most intimate aspirations and personal projections. When it succeeds, brand is not only selling you a
product, nor are they are selling you the idea of a product, but instead they are selling you a better you.
As a vehicle for expression, brands are unparalleled. They transform a simple object into a
meaningful statement — a world of meanings that is wielded by the individual consumer, to provide
something capable of extending and leveraging their own equally flexible identity. The brand presents us
with a readymade set of meanings that we can co-opt, inhabit, and make ours. In constructing a new
framework of thought, beginning from the first point, we recognize that, fundamentally, branded material
allows for an externalization, an embodiment of identity. In a simple sense, it makes the task of
representing and projecting oneself easier. In our world of rampant consumerism and branding, we see
modern marketing as a clear answer to the fundamental human need for externalization and embodiment
of identity. Thus, on this most superficial level, we see a direct dialectical relationship between the human
need for externalization and the branded material world.
It is upon this recognition of the human need for externalization and some kind of selfactualization — fantastical or not — that the brand seeks to engage. Brands, from a marketer’s
perspective, are useful icons, repositories, or even totemic entities that are capable of storing and
emanating a tremendous amount of meaning. In this way, they are invaluable investments; over time they
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can come to accrue deep meaning and resonance that represents a clear beacon and promise to the
consumer. In our hyper-technologized era of consumerism, we are bombarded with thousands of brands
every day—each of which jostles against the others, seeking to catch our attention, to “speak” something
meaningful to us. The parade of brands flicker past our glazed eyes, yet there are only a privileged few
that manage to clearly cut through the clutter. Thus, the project of branding, from the perspective of a
marketer, is to create and cultivate a compellingly meaningful identity, with the hopes of creating a
meaningful connection. Often this begins by identifying the needs, wants and desires that are not being
addressed or “spoken to” effectively in the marketplace.
For the big players—Fortune 500 companies and the like—the question is often approached more
broadly: What brand identity or personality can we own? Brands exist in a highly competitive product
category environment in which no one wants to share brand territory. After identifying an opening or
weakness, (which marketers call “white space”) these brands reach for the most aspirational high-ground
territory set available in a category, upon which to establish their brand identity. By doing so, they seek
to not only establish a positive bounded claim, but also to preemptively establish a defense so that they
can deflect or subsume competitors who dare to set up camp on the territory the brand “owns.” There are
many examples of mis-attribution — where a consumer sees a competitor’s advertising and attributes it to
the dominant brand. This is, in part, the practice of the brand — to leave little-to-no solid territory for
other brands to occupy, and to forcefully dominate their space. In essence, brands seek to construct and
project a distinct and unmistakable identity with all its components: emotional, visual, symbolic,
archetypal, sonic. For the most dominant brands—the household names— this “claim” becomes
immediately evident: Coke owns the color red, Corona owns the beach, Affleck owns the “duck quack,”
Nike owns the energy, uplift and boldness of the swoosh, etc. However, these more immediate brand
claims are anchored with a fully-realized and highly-managed and deliberate identity. Over time, within
their categories, brands seek to own key emotional values as well, and become symbols of these values.
Apple owns creative elegance. Heineken owns European/Global sophistication. Haagen-Daz owns
decadent, adult sensual indulgence, while Ben & Jerry’s owns innocent, playful, chaotic, sweet joy. In
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each of these categories, the brands have staked their identity, and, for example, even though they both
share the category of “ice cream,” Haagen-Daz and Ben & Jerry’s have each created highly differentiated
brands in order to leverage their unique skills, and craft a brand that speaks to their consumer in their
unique way. In establishing their own recognizable identity, they tap into deep emotional territory. This
itself cuts right to the heart of brand, as a response to a human need for externalization and selfactualization.
Chapter 2- The Intersection of Brand and Identity
Having established our project’s analytical framework for the brand—what it looks like, how and
why it works, what it does— we are now finally at the point where we are able to go into the
consumer/brand relationship. We will now seek to narrow our view and analyze the specific and situated
consumer/brand relationship. To begin, by centering on brand and identity, it is necessary to reiterate that,
while the brand is a carefully crafted and voiced projection that the consumer “hears,” each consumer
hears this voice in their own way. Elements of the brand proposition are accepted, while some are ignored
or rejected—consumers pick and choose. As we have called attention to throughout our project, the brand
is a dynamic vehicle. Brand is engaged, interpreted, and personalized by the individual consumer and
incorporated into the endless human cycle of self-creation.
To explore the role of brand in self-creation, the projection and externalization of self, we have to
break down its elements and mechanisms. Brand is seen as a readymade object or device that consumers
often implicitly describe as assisting in “understanding yourself” on the level of individual identity,
because brand is often perceived as being more flexible than one’s “actual” individual identity. There are,
of course, ranges of this sentiment within every brand engagement — from individuals who seem to
engage brand as a kind of ready-made device that can assist in the augmentation of the self, to far deeper
and more intimate levels of identity-construction. But even when the brand is described as a kind of
device of augmentation, consumers still are engaging with the construction of identity via brand even in
seemingly superficial every-day instances. Individuals will use brand to reinforce, amplify, extend etc.
various aspects of their internal and external identity. To begin, by discussing brand as a kind of device of
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augmentation: this is one of the central ways that brand can clearly be seen as being an engrained part of
everyday life, as well as the perpetual process of identity-creation and externalization. Each interaction
with commodity is an interaction with brand and its meanings—consciously or unconsciously. The brand
is always described as “allowing” or “inviting” the consumer do something. To provide an example, as
one focus group participant responded when asked what an ice-cream brand “did” for them, “This is
more outgoing, social — would make me into a great singer! I would run straight home to my sister, pull
out two spoons and a bottle of champagne and have a seat on the couch and chat.” Here, this participant
exemplifies how brands are imaged as a sort of emotional trigger. Here, brand is seen as being a catalyst
to change and augment your personality and identity in the moment, and perhaps more broadly.
This conception of brand carries over across a range of brands from consumer goods to
cosmetics, and, while it appears in different forms, it ultimately returns to the idea that brand “invites” or
“allows” for you to be, or do, something you might not normally do — an established feature of brand.
For an additional example, turning to a cosmetic brand project conducted in primarily Asian markets: a
female participant in Bankok responded, “It makes me feel emotional, safe – it makes me feel like they
can take care of us in every way. I am happy that they can help other people.” In the same project,
another participant in New York echoed her sentiment, “This is about being invincible. It is beyond
strong. It is saying no matter what happens you can take anything at all. You are invincible.” The brand
conveys its basic promises and attributes to the consumer, who, in turn, interprets and engages them in
their own individual way. On a material product level, the brand “tool” may be the “same,” but the
moment it comes into contact with the consumer it becomes their tool, their unique property to interpret
and engage in whatever way they see fit. Brand as a flexible tool to augment identity is undoubtedly one
of its most salient features, but also a site where we can see very clearly the way that individuals engage
and use brand.
Moving beyond brand as a tool for augmentation, as this is really only the outermost layer of the
way brand invokes and engages consumer identity, we approach a deeper analysis of brand where there is
much more at stake. Brand engagement naturally has a varied range; your attachment to the BMW you’ve
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saved up for 20 years is going to be different than your attachment to the brand of deodorant you use. The
brand reflects back the same level of emotional wattage of a consumers’s engagement—it is a kind of
personal mirror. The closer we get to commodities that have higher socio-cultural stakes, brand becomes
more explicitly engaged with a more intimate individual identity and, in turn, the creation and
externalization of identity. This is especially true with brands in categories that are predictably associated
with status and image — things that are, in general, more external or “public,” such as cars, clothes, and
alcohol. Projects that deal with brands of this nature more readily evoke a far more personal and intimate
engagement with brand. For example, a recent project for a financial corporation evoked highly
aspirational engagement with the brand that eclipsed mere financial success — to activate and elicit
personal aspirations and desires that consumers associated with the brand, and in turn, themselves. As one
male participant in Atlanta put it, “(blank) leads to excitement. Fulfillment. A key to unlocking future
possibilities. An emotional space worrying about life goals. All about personal experience and the
investment in self. I want to improve. I’m a high school teacher, but I’m getting these great educational
goals. I have some big projects brewing at any given time.” Another participant in the same project in
Seattle corroborated, “(Blank) is there for you to better experience life. I would probably save the money,
then go and do it. I think they want you to think about – why wait? Why not do these things now? Here’s
this card to better experience life. These other cards won’t do it for you.” Still another participant from a
different Seattle group responded, “A whole new mood. More of a unique spending atmosphere. Be more
active. Actually do what you say you’re going to do. This is serious living. Plan it. Do it. Let’s move on
to the next thing. Made me want to plan an outing with my card.”
Who would think that a card’s brand would make such a difference or have such an effect? After
all, at the basic product level they’re really all doing the exact same thing, but they’re branding it and
thereby “voicing” it differently. In this high social value kind of market, category branding is almost
always ratcheted up, and we clearly see why. The deeper a brand finds itself inside a consumer’s identity,
the more space there is for the consumer to assert themselves and engage in a deeper emotional way. That
said, surprisingly, it is not always easy to predict what products and brands individuals consider to be
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essential to who they are. While brand’s role in self-creation can be more visible and explicit in more
socially charged commodities, it is present at all levels of the consumer/brand engagement. After all, the
project of self-creation is deeply personal and varies from individual to individual. A brand that means
nothing to one person’s identity could easily be seen as an essential part for another—as our stratified
focus groups demonstrate time and time again. Some of the most seemingly mundane brands have yielded
incredible insight into how deeply consumers engage with brand and the imagery they have created. Just
as self-creation is an extremely personal thing, our project’s engagement with brand is a reflection of this
same quality.
Brand confers agency to the consumer in our modern marketplace insofar as we pick and choose
what particular brand we consume. Implicit in this choice is, more often than not, a choice of what brand
fits best with an individual’s perceived identity. Brand, more importantly, confers agency to a consumer
when the consumer recognizes that the brand is speaking to them, and, seemingly, to them alone. Even
while brand is projecting itself onto millions of consumers, the average consumer nevertheless feels
spoken to by virtue of the fact that they—consciously or not— allow certain brands entry, while
simultaneously tuning out the overwhelming clamor of the rest. Even within this mass-produced object
with its mass-produced brand, each individual will necessarily have their own unique engagement with its
brand. Suggesting that we all consume the same brand seems tantamount to suggesting that consumers
have no individuality. To illustrate: when I see myself in a brand, I am effectively translating a meaning
and making it my own. I am engaging in an interactive process—no matter how large or small—of selfcreation. If we reduce agency to its essential definition and connect it with brand, we find a device of
“free choice,” which is exactly what our modern marketplace seems to be offering up.
Today, we are witnessing an explosion of brand. It has massively proliferated across the
marketplace, taking on many forms: entrepreneurship and the start-up, the new digital marketplace, and
an increasingly globalized marketplace. With our working binary model of consumer/brand, it is only
logical that the more consumers there are, the more brands there will be. Furthermore, we are living in a
time of rapid social change, where large swaths of consumers who were previously ignored are just now
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beginning to find themselves acknowledged and “spoken to” by the brand. Whether it is changing social
conditions, or marketers finally realizing that they have ignored a massive block of potential consumers,
we cannot say with absolute certainty. What we can say is that there is a recent and significant upsurge in
the creation of brands that are specifically marketed to target previously-marginalized minority groups.
After all, it was only in 2009 that “Black Barbie” made her debut. To this day, large corporations are
scrambling to “catch up,” creating products—cosmetics, toys, clothing etc.—specifically marketed to
African Americans, as well as other previously “ignored” consumer groups. Flavored alcoholic
beverages, from vodkas to ciders, are attracting countless new female drinkers. Here, by virtue of being
ushered into, and recognized by, the marketplace, brand has had an empowering effect. If we take it that
the brand already inherently confers agency to its consumer via the consumer recognizing or “hearing”
that they are being “spoken to,” then it follows that individual consumers — who had previously never
felt directly acknowledged by the marketplace, but now feel that they are being recognized, valued, and
spoken to for the first time — would feel an especially powerful sense of agency.
This sense of agency — both the general agency of being spoken to by a brand, as well as the
heightened agency produced when a previously “ignored” consumer is finally being acknowledge by the
brand in the marketplace — is a phenomena that is evident in focus groups with African Americans and
Latinos in the U.S. We see that the subject of brand’s involvement in the question of agency is a complex
and layered one — perhaps, a question we cannot fully address. However, while we are more hesitant to
make any strong claims about the socio-political ramifications in relation to agency and brand, we are not
shying away from our assertion that, on a fundamental level, brand confers upon its consumer some
degree of agency solely by virtue of the consumer choosing the brand that they felt better fit their identity,
and that this sense of agency is only heightened when that consumer had previously not been addressed
by the brand marketplace. This said, our project cannot sidestep the question of socio-political agency
even if we don’t have a fully developed answer. One particularly illustrative example of this “sociopolitical agency” via brand was a media project that conducted focus groups across major cities in South
America. Speaking to focus groups comprised solely of women, the major theme that arose across almost
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every marketplace (with the exception of Argentina) was that women felt as though they were being
invited into the public sphere for the first time because they recognized that they were being spoken to—
for the first time— by brands in the branded advertisements they were beginning to see. The most
common theme was that women were being invited to leave the narrow confines of a traditional marriage
and household responsibility, and step into the “outside world,” a place that previously was not a place for
most of these women. The irony of this, of course, is that they received this message and continue to
receive it from inside the home—from the television. However, as we have touched upon, all of this
increasing proliferation of media—which is the primary conduit of brand advertising across the globe —
has everything to do with the rise of brand. As a Colombian woman put it, “Today it is easier for us, we
have more knowledge, in the past everything was harder.” More directly relating to the subject of agency,
a Brazilian woman said, “You want to learn new things, you step out of your little world and you look for
different things…I tried looking for different things and people said it was too much, and I wanted to
improve something. You want to have your life make more sense. You can’t stay in the house, you have
to get out there - so you need to know a lot about everything - so I am like that - I try to learn different
things.” Here, it is the proliferation of knowledge via the television, but also branded advertising, that is
inviting women to “leave the house” and step into the world — an invitation that is, by and large, a byproduct of a corporation’s attempt to make more money. As our report notes, women are already entering
the marketplace feeling, for the first time, that they are being invited — a result of brands creating
advertisements targeted specifically at women. Our recommendation was to get on this trend.
While there are complex social factors and histories that we cannot entirely account for, what we
can report is that across metropolitan cities in Latin America, women—especially those from a lower
income bracket— in a relatively short amount of time, felt increasingly empowered by a media
environment that was recognizing them for the first time and speaking to them, and which was universally
framed as a sort of invitation to leave the traditional place for women and step into the outside world. In
other words, branded advertising played a major role in witnessing, inviting, and calling women to see
themselves differently—which they happily did. Putting motivations aside, there was no doubt that the
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emergence of brands and their advertisements targeting women was a major factor. It was here, through
the medium of television, that these women were, for the first time, being “heard,” recognized, and
wanted, by the marketplace, the traditional domain of men. Here, the brand undoubtably contributed
significantly in empowering women with newfound agency. Without making any value judgments, it is
fair to say that this example reveals the incredible power brand has, to engage and be engaged with, to
create the possibility of a new kind of agency and a new understanding of selfhood.
To posit a stronger suggestion, in our project we saw the emergence of women not through a
social upheaval—in stark contrast to the U.S.’s social revolution in the 60’s— but through a “marketing
revolution.” Here, marketing is seemingly sidestepping the “political,” and appears to be emancipating
women through the agentic power of the brand. In this context, the agency conferred by brand seems to
have taken on an entirely new dimension insofar as the consumers were invited to leave the home and
enter the unfamiliar world of the marketplace, and step into a new social platform. What seems
completely novel is that women were given this new agency, by brand, essentially through a process of
learning from the brand. Brand had seemingly created a new space for women, but the only source of
knowledge for learning how to act in this new space also came from brand, implicitly forcing women to
identify as brand, insofar as brand seemed the singular source of this “new” identity. Women talked about
how they were “learning” or being “prepared” for an entry into this new way of “being.” While there are
undoubtedly other factors at play here, the new brand landscape was continually framed by participants as
both the provocateur (and creator) and the “teacher” (also a kind of creator) of this new construction of
self in the “outside world.” While we clearly see brand as creating a new kind of agency and selfhood,
there are deeper dimensions—such as brand presenting a new model of self— that cannot be
authoritatively spoken about. Yet, even if we cannot speak authoritatively, it is necessary to mark this as a
place where, by all accounts, it seems as though participants are engaging the self-constructive and
agentic qualities of brand on a still deeper level insofar as they are learning a new kind personhood under
the tutelage of brand. In this sense of modeling themselves after brand, are these participants, in some
way or another, “self-branding?”
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To conclude our analysis of the intersection of brand and identity, we turn to what is, by all
accounts, the latest development of the brand. In this form, brand is fully aware of what it is, how it
works, and what it does. This is the intersection of self and brand. The idea of “personal branding” is not
a foreign word or concept. There are some articles on the subject, mostly from the business side, with one
exception. Anthropologist Ilana Gershon touches on the subject of “personal branding” in her 2014 article
Selling Your Self in the United States. However, Gershon has already taken and accepted both “personal
branding’ and her reformulation, “corporate personhood branding,” to be a starting place, and doesn't
appear to be interested in the social implications of phenomenons more broadly, but rather in a textbookesque analysis of the “breakdowns” associated with the individual attempting “corporate personhood,”
illustrating the difficulties with embodying a cohesive branded identity across multiple platforms in the
corporate context. What I mean here is that Gershon, among other academics, are responding to the rise of
“personal branding” as though it were just another trend in business and hiring practices, without
reflexively questioning the cultural significance of individuals attempting to become “brands.” Gershon
briefly engages with the anthropological discourse of brand, yet fails to highlight or address what a
significant development personal branding is, even as the semiotic connection between product/brand
becomes individual/brand. The phenomena of “corporate personhood branding” should not be
anthropologically engaged before the phenomena of “personal branding,” as this is a move to the specific
without first accounting for the more general phenomena. The vast majority of Americans who engage the
practices of “personal branding” on some level or another, are not doing so in a corporate context—this is
a fundamental disagreement. Furthermore, Gershon and others who write on “personal branding” from
the business angle, are writing about a “sanitized” phenomena where the framework of brand has attracted
crude attempts to copy or co-opt the most superficial elements of brand, and where the individual, in
Gershon’s words is “expected to behave as a brand” — for example, perform a consistent and
recognizable, yet fluid, identity. Individuals are only expected to behave as a brand on the most
superficial level; they are expected to present themselves in a cohesive and attractive way. However, this
is not what brand does on a corporate level, nor does it do justice to how individuals engage with brand.
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Here, the quickly-becoming-buzzword “brand” is nothing more than an attractive model or analogy to
employ. In short, these articles on “personal branding” are already working with a stilted conception of
brand in every sense of the word, and, although our projects share the same words—“person” and
“brand”—, we might as well be speaking different languages, as our engagements of “person” and
“brand” are on completely different levels.
Missing the mark of attempting to engage with the implications of a world where brand is not
only untethered from product but, in some bizarre inversion, attached to its consumer, we have to begin at
a more basic level. The emergence of personal or self-branding is not necessarily a surprise for a
generation that has grown up in a world where almost everything is marketed and made with a brand
meaning. Manning coined the term “dematerialization” of brand to describe a separation from product
and brand. Now this language of “dematerialization” seems to require a wider range, as the meaning of
brand itself has seemingly been detached from its traditional context. Drawing from our media work over
the years, the framework of the brand appears to be increasingly interpolated into an understanding of the
self. We most clearly see this if we look into our increasingly social-media-dominated lives. To introduce
our major themes, we turn to a mid-2000’s project on the media habits of teenage girls that surveyed
multiple markets wherein one of the most poignant themes was the commonly-held belief that an
individual’s social media page was a more “authentic” articulation of self—the articulation of identity as
if it were a brand. In short, it appeared as though, for these participants, the locus of identity was no
longer physical, it was virtual; and one’s essence was articulated within one’s brand, and not their
physical self. Here, the rise of social media had seemingly created a necessity for creating and curating
one’s identity. As one participant summed it up, “If you hung out with me for 10-15 minutes, I wouldn’t
tell you that much. It’s like, what would I say? I think that Instagram tells my life story in pictures.” With
social media being one of the most important social “spaces,” it has seemingly altered the way these
participants imagined, created themselves, and conducted themselves in the social sphere. Social media
presents itself as an increasingly important social site with significant attraction, that our social
interactions, and even our externalization and sense of self, lack—control. As one teenager put it, “It's a
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social world. You don’t have to be direct all the time…You can be whoever you want with Instagram or
Twitter.” The theme of control dominates, “With social media you are the one doing this story. You feel
more accomplishment when you do it.” Some described the pressures of “presenting yourself” on social
media to be burdensome, but obligatory, while others seemed to relish the control over their social life
that can only be found within social media. The theme that complimented this sense of “control” was the
idea that, on social media you are able to build yourself; as one participant put it, “It’s like daydreaming,
you’re building yourself.” Another participant echoes her, “You want to personalize what is coming in
and going out. It’s personal time, like dreaming, You’re building yourself and your knowledge.” All
these quotes are from stratified groups and markets. Here, the notion of any authentic self is secondary or
entirely absent from the constructed self that is built and controlled through social media. One young
woman in a group said she needed to reinvent her brand over the weekend, and was planning to give her
entire Facebook page a total re-vamp towards that end. Individuals would clearly articulate an image that
they were seeking to construct, and how, and why, they were doing it. Working in marketing, hearing this
articulation is uncanny, but at the same time it seems a plausible progression. The branded media-scape
has, perhaps, relayed the brand message so effectively that it has “taught” us the brand. Consciously or
unconsciously, there has been—to some degree— an interpellation of brand into our everyday lives. The
implicit scaffolding of brand—creation, message, control—has seemingly seeped into our collective
psyche.
Brand has proven itself to be such a powerful device for consumers in the general project of selfcreation, directly by virtue of the recognition—conscious or not— of a relational engagement with brand.
Consumers have recognized that they are spoken to and heard, and on a fundamental level that brand
confers upon its consumer some degree of agency solely by virtue of the consumer choosing the brand
that they feel will better fit their identity. When I see myself in a brand, I am effectively translating a
meaning and making it my own. I am engaging in a process—no matter how large or small—of self
creation through a distinctly relational engagement with brand. Thus, the brand, however it is understood
by the consumer, has become associated with an agency over the self. Brand is already an explicit part of
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our identity in its product form, but as brand is increasingly recognized as a powerful vehicle to confer
agency over the self, the brand has seemingly begun to take on a new object form—the individual. This
can be seen in the superficial pop-culture discourse of “personal-branding,” but we see an entirely
different, and more intimate, picture when individuals begin to talk about creating and projecting a
cohesive personal image and identity via social media. Essentially, these individuals are treating a part, or
parts, of their identity as if it were a brand. In an analogous process to the marketers, these individuals are
designing their brand around their “social consumer,” attempting to anticipate the dimensional identity
that the “social consumer” wants or expects to see, and then modeling and constructing a cohesive
identity—in the same way a brand would—that is appealing to the social consumer. Now, these claims
being made here are the result of observations and analysis that were conducted 11 years ago—we must
imagine that much has changed. Since this project, the social force of brand has increased exponentially.
This, of course, is coupled with the emergence and massive proliferation of new technologies and
media—the smartphone, new social media platforms—which have created an increasingly “wired in”
culture. Brand, in its classical definition, has not only been strengthened, but we also see that the
intersection of brand and identity has taken on a new emergent form—identity as brand. Here, our project
of understanding how brand works as a device of self-creation and externalization is our foundation for
not only understanding brand as it is, but also brand as it will be—where it is going. The formulation of
brand which we have identified will serve us in critically engaging the fundamental question of what it
means for the individual to coexist with the increasingly branded world.
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CONCLUSION
Not Just What Brand Is, but Where Brand is Going
Our philosophical component of this project began by tracing a figurative crack in the writing of
Plato and Aristotle, identifying a pervasive difficulty in engaging with the question of exactly what makes
property essential yet problematic. Identifying this fundamental tension affixed to property, Marx’s
framework then supplied an essential insight, shedding light on this unspoken tension—the notion that
property always exists in a social context. Marx’s commodity inherently encodes the social context of the
product. As Marx reveals, the tension inherent in commodity evolves around its fetishism, and the social
relations involved in production appear as alienated economic relationships of exchange. In essence, the
instability or tension inherent in the commodity is a product of a void created by the rupture of social
meaning and economic meaning. Our project put forward the idea that the brand—as a device of meaning
making—would inevitably gravitate towards this Marxian void between consumer and commodity, and
present the possibility of reinventing the alienated and abstracted commodity. In short, our philosophical
engagement identified the salient characteristic of the commodity to be its social meaning— encoded as
brand. More importantly however, beginning our project through a philosophic analysis revealed the
chimeric character of the brand — a thing that appears so naturalized and basic in the human imagination,
yet simultaneously intangible. Our anthropological analysis began with brand as a relationship between
consumer and brand, and our provocation emerged out of an insistence on a situated analysis of the
intersection of brand and identity, presenting that brand serves as a dynamic vehicle for self-creation—
constructing and externalizing identity as well as conferring agency to the consumer. When you see
yourself recognized by a brand, you are effectively translating a meaning and making it your own,
engaging in a process—no matter how large or small—of self-creation. I have argued that, in the
relational engagement with brand, consumers have recognized that they are spoken to and heard, and that,
on a fundamental level, brand confers upon its consumer some degree of agency, solely by virtue of the
consumer choosing the brand that aligns with their identity. However, our journey to discover a new
understanding of brand has not simply been for the sake of presenting something “new,” but has also been
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a way to critically engage what this new understanding of brand might mean on a deeper level for the alltoo-often ignored individual consumer.
While our project reveals a new way of understanding brand, what is really at stake here is, quite
simply, that through the project of understanding the brand, we see the possibility for understanding
ourselves on an individual level. In our modern consumer society, the existential tension and instability
inherent in the construction and externalization of personal identity is fundamentally intertwined with the
brand as we inhabit a world where the brand is the prevailing medium for the essential task of personal
meaning making. Thus, it seems as though the instability of not just the consumer/brand relationship, but
also the more fundamental individual/property relationship—that we saw in Plato and Aristotle—, is
directly related to the instability inherent in the human experience of “being,” of constructing and
externalizing our meaning. The usage of brand as a device for the articulation and externalization of
identity is as varied as the ever-changing multitude of identities that populate our planet. We create and
are created by the world that we live in—nothing, today, illustrates this more clearly than the brand.
The utility of our project in understanding and engaging brand requires us to return to the self,
and consider—through a new perspective—how individual engagements with brand are another way of
understanding “the self.” As our project grounds our conception of brand not only in the implicit need for
the externalization of the self but also an externalization via the “other,” Hegel’s seminal 1809 text The
Phenomenology of Spirit is the natural place to turn. Hegel notably predicated his philosophical
framework on the fundamental need for human externalization in the world coupled with a metaphysics
of material. This alone makes Hegel uniquely valuable in analyzing the amalgamation of identity and
material that is the brand. For our purposes, Hegel’s endowing material with physical and sensual
qualities is perhaps more important for its negation of material; under a Hegelian conception, material has
no inherent qualities beyond its physical properties, and from this “emptiness” springs the human need to
give and create meaning and order to the world of things. To describe, on the most cursory level, Hegel’s
phenomenology: before externalization, Hegel begins with self-containment, where the self only sees the
self; however, as soon as we learn of our incompleteness, we require externalization. The subject (self)
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recognizes the need for object (other), and seeks unification. The desire to externalize and instantiate
oneself is overwhelming (Hegel, 18). In its simplest form, externalization as an active action is a ceaseless
process where we construct and re-construct the self in an endless cycle. Unlike Hegel and many other
philosophers, our project took the necessity of the externalization of self as a starting point; however,
engagement with brand is also an act of externalization or self-creation. And, as Hegel evidences, this
process of externalization—where we construct and re-construct our identifies—is not at all unlike our
everyday engagement with brand as we construct and augment our identities. Most importantly, Hegel’s
construction of externalization as an overwhelming desire to be recognized by the “other,” appears as a
direct mirror of our assertion that brand efficacy is a direct result of the consumer feeling “recognized” or
“spoken to” by brand.
Hegel establishes a consideration of a phenomenological construction of individual and material,
by establishing material as purely physical—and nothing else—, thus requiring interpretation and the
creation of “meaning.” As Hegel writes, “Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself when, and by
the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (Hegel, 111). Turning
to Hegel’s “Master Slave Dialectic,” on closer examination, it is a unique moment in Hegel’s project
where the externalization of the self in relation to the other is joined with Hegel’s materialism. At first
glance, Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic exemplifies the struggle for externalization; the self comes into
contact with the “other” and immediately recognizes its incompleteness. In an attempt to make itself
whole again, through the domination and possession of the other, a violent struggle ensues. However, we
find that the slave, who was seemingly subjugated, is able to free himself. As Hegel shows, one of the
primary mechanisms for this escape from bondage via externalization comes about through the creation
of material and the recognition of oneself in the material “other” that has been created. As Hegel writes,
“…in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists
essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself
through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that is his pure self—for—being, which
in this externality is seen by him to be the truth” (Hegel, 194). This externalization is the ultimate goal of
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recognition, the act of seeing the self in other. The self does not simply come to recognize itself through
some unmediated realization, but rather this recognition of independence and externality is constructed
through a union with the thing, illustrating that externalization of the self is possible through material.
One of the most immediate things Hegel’s text affirms for us is that the creation and externalization of
self as an endless process of constructing and reconstructing the self in relation to the “other” is a
fundamental part of human identity, and it is increasingly clear that brand acts as this material “other.”
And as we live in an increasingly material world with the advent of now-globalized consumerism, the
brand as the “other” becomes a larger part of our daily lives. Furthermore, Hegel’s master/slave
dichotomy mirrors the common post-Marxian corporation/consumer dichotomy that Critical Theory
perpetuates, when in reality individuals are re-shaping and externalizing what appears as a ready-made
brand—we are not a slave to the brand. Hegel allows us one final reconsideration of what it could mean to
recognize and understand the brand. Through recognizing the internal power of the brand in our everyday
lives in its specific manifestations and mechanisms, the individual is even further empowered to dictate
their relationship with brand and the systems of capitalism it represents—as we are beginning to see
already.
This is where our project has led us: the understanding that brand cannot be an external analytical
object. When we look at the brand landscapes we are looking at a kind of tapestry comprised of individual
needs, wants, and desires—reflecting a kaleidoscope of self-created, collectively-sourced identity. The
real power of brand is derived not from the marketers who create it, but from the fundamental human
need for meaning. On the subject of meaning, the millennial generation, shaped by a mind-blowing
transformation in communication technology, has created a forum for the display and even
aggrandizement and proliferation of identity, but also the democratization of knowledge and information,
leading to the demise of clear, credentialed authority. In this vacuum of a once-collective authority
structure, brand has stepped in and displaced the societal and authoritative structures that helped provide
the grist for identity creation. In so doing, brand has attained a quasi-spiritual dimension as an object of
power, meaning and worship. In our modern technologized society, where the traditional structures in the
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construction individual “meaning” are slowly eroding —religion, social intimacy, and clear collective
cultural values—, the brand increasingly appears to fill this void. Just a mere generation ago, the majority
of young people developed most of their beliefs, values, knowledge and identities from their parents,
family and local community. The world-wide web, our new collective commons, is now still less than 25
years old. Yet today, young people have access to information, media, answers and different perspectives
from all corners of the universe. In other words, they now have unparalleled access, and in turn the
possibility of sourcing a completely “new” formulation of personal agency. It is in this new uncharted
territory of identity creation that brand has become one of the most dynamic drivers or vehicles for
meaning in our highly-mediated social context.
We find ourselves in uncharted territory for both identity creation and brand. Nothing illustrates
this more poignantly than the rise of “self-branding.” The brand and its meaning and power, which has
traditionally belonged to the power-brokers of business, is being reclaimed and repurposed by the
consumer who realizes— now I, too, can wield brand. In this new uncharted territory of self-creation,
identity has not only been rediscovered and self-created, but brand has also given us a model for a whole
new kind of social projection and promotion of our identity. Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram,
Snapchat, and more, all represent this nexus of self-publication. The ‘identity’ of brand has always been a
more fluid medium, but now — coupled with the rise of new and powerful social media vehicles, an
environment in which the brand thrives— there is a whole new venue that invites us to wield brand, to
create and project our identity as a brand. The erosion of the old structures that served as the basis for
identity-creation are quickly being supplanted by a new ever-changing world of limitless access to
information which, in turn, invokes the possibility of a new formulation for identity creation to match this
new world. Suddenly we have the immense free-wheeling power of the brand, and we find ourselves in
an unprecedented era of self-creation through brand. It seems necessary to ask, where does it go from
here? Since we create identity through the agency of brand, and then have the capacity to harness this
personal brand, the next logical step seems to be an even stronger identity that is free and untethered in
our new mediated world.
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So, what happens when individuals become brands? While we may still be at the threshold of the
era of “self-branding,” the average person is certainly engaging with, and closely observing and learning
from, a mass of individuals who act as brands. It is nearly impossible to think of any prominent cultural
figure today who has not leveraged “self-branding” via social media to create and project their identity to
the masses, from Kim Kardashian and Caitlin Jenner to Neil deGrasse Tyson, Julian Assange, Michael
Moore and so on. It is worth wondering: having followed brand this far, where will we be led next?
Follow the Leader- The Rise of the Trump Brand
There is no more poignantly-charged exemplar of this cultural turn away from the traditional
forms of knowledge, agency and identity, than Trump. While Trump is the most extreme and perhaps
mutant example, more than anyone else he signifies this break. Trump transgressed the status quo
throughout his successful bid for presidency at every point. A celebrity businessman well-versed in the
power of brand, Trump, the individual, has been subsumed by the “Trump brand” — a brand of his own
creation. He therefore best exemplifies the unhinged power of personal brand on media steroids. On
Twitter, where anything can be said and anything can be retracted, Trump creates and embodies a new
kind of authority: an authority grounded squarely in the powerful brand he has created for himself, and
leveraging an agency and authority as a successful businessman and political outsider who says the things
that most of us think but are too scared to say. Anti-status quo on every level, Trump speaks his mind
however, and whenever, he wants. He has wholly ceded his identity and selfhood to his brand. Trump has
created and managed a mobile brand, and has “broadcast” it through Twitter, in the same way any other
person might—except that he has millions of followers. While Twitter is his personal platform of choice,
his brand is picked up and proliferated across the complete spectrum of media to make the impact of his
brand a global phenomenon. His authority and legitimacy as a candidate and an individual are fabricated
by this personal brand that he creates and perpetuates. Throughout the campaign and into his presidency,
Trump capitalized ruthlessly on the mistrust of the traditionally unquestionable authority of the media and
political experts, creating his own fabricated truths on the authority of his word alone, all the while
branding and dismissing all negative information and reporting as “fake-news.” Trump, as a branded
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personality, exemplifies the fluidity and continual re-creation of self that the brand allows: falling back on
previous promises, making outlandish claims and then retracting or reconstructing them; his tweets alone
become the headlines on the front pages of every major news source. The instability of “knowledge” and
“fact” in a post-Trump world is the direct product of the instability of the new kind of agentic identity that
brand allows us to wield—here, in a very extreme form. The branding of the self is intertwined with the
new technologized paradigm shift of knowledge and identity creation—the question of where authority
and agency, where “truth,” comes from, is all on the table.
***
Today, we travel through a mediascape of brand where the messages are projected into our mind
every time we take the subway, read a magazine, watch TV, and browse the internet. And yet, we are not
passive journeymen through our environment. Each of us have become carriers and purveyors of brand:
we wear it, we use it, we say it, and we wield it personally. Brand simultaneously exists everywhere and
nowhere. Speaking to you in your own voice, brand recognizes you, and you recognize yourself in the
other as it appears in you—in this moment you have become brand—; this is the magic of brand.
Increasingly, as individuals begin to recognize and wield the alchemy that is brand in their own unique
way, the understanding of what it means to be an individual is intertwined with the questions of brand.
We create and are created by the increasingly brand-driven world that we live in. Already we lag far
behind the ever-shifting chimeric brand phenomena; there is not a moment to waste. The time to critically
engage the alchemy of brand is now.
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